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Preface
In 1999, my employer at that time gave me the opportunity to go to Silicon Valley and work
there for almost two years. A fantastic experience, certainly for an engineer in technical
physics. First and foremost, that is the place where technological history is written. But also,
and perhaps even more importantly, there is an enormous dynamism in the region, coupled
with a very high level of ambition among those working there. Silicon Valley is in fact one
huge incubator for technostarters; young businesses developing their own high-quality
technologies.
As we all know, The Valley has long had close links with Stanford University. It was the
university which made land available for the very first business park, and encouraged students
such as Hewlett and Packard to start up their own businesses. The knowledge flows copiously
back and forth between the university and the start-ups.
I was reminded of all this when writing this foreword. After all, a significant problem that
emerges from this collection of articles is the ‘Dutch paradox’. In other words: why is it that our
universities belong to the top ten in the world, but there is so little cross-pollination with the
business community? 
Various reasons can be put forward for this. 
During their studies, Dutch students are not taught enough practical entrepreneurial skills.
Young people see their futures more as employees rather than entrepreneurs. It is not ‘cool’ to
start up one’s own business. The curriculum of educational establishments only serves to
confirm this preference.
Budding entrepreneurs find it difficult to find investors in the Netherlands who are willing to
finance projects during the initial phase. We, the Dutch, appear to be wary about taking risks.
Finally, patent policy, tax matters and attitude do not always make collaboration between
universities and new entrepreneurs very easy
Should we be concerned about this? Certainly, because young businesses are responsible to a
very great extent for employment in the longer term. In addition, technostarters contribute
significantly to innovation, which in its turn ensures economic growth. It is not without reason
that the coalition agreement has stipulated that an Innovation Platform has to be created,
headed by the Prime Minister.
There is a role for the Ministry of Economic Affairs in all problem areas. In our policy strategy,
incubators play an important role. They can support technostarters by providing facilities,
finance and coaching. That is why the Ministry of Economic Affairs has recently started up a
variety of initiatives for starters, such as Twinning and BioPartner. Even though these have their
merits, they do also lead to undesirable fragmentation. We therefore want to streamline the
existing programmes and bring them together in a clear structure: TechnoPartner. We also want
to give greater attention to entrepreneurship in education.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 6
TechnoPartner is all about policy intention. You can read more about TechnoPartner in this
collection of articles, containing contributions about the background to and causes of the
‘Dutch paradox’ from a domestic and foreign perspective. We hope they will inspire us to join
forces to enhance the innovative ability of The Netherlands Ltd. 
Karien van Gennip
State Secretary for Economic AffairsEntrepreneurship in the Netherlands 7
Introduction
This is the sixth edition of the series “Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands” . The series started
in 1997 and is a joint publication of the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs and EIM
Business & Policy Research. 
This 2003 edition deals with knowledge transfer from universities and other knowledge
institutes to innovative start-ups. Given the process of growing international competition,
enterprises are increasingly forced to focus on the development of new products, services and
processes to distinguish themselves from competitors. Knowledge infrastructure is an
important source for scientific insights, whether developed on assignment on demand of
enterprises or autonomously by universities and research institutes. Improving competitiveness
calls for an increasing importance of knowledge transfer between public knowledge institutions
and private parties as a channel for matching knowledge supply and demand. 
In addition to experts from our own organisations, we have asked Professor Alan Hughes,
director of the Centre of Business Research (CBR) based at the University of Cambridge, to
give his opinion on the Dutch situation and the policy developed.
In the first chapter, Niels Bosma of EIM discusses entrepreneurial activity - and in particular the
role of innovative start-ups - in the Netherlands in an international perspective: i.e., compared
with Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
the USA. The assessment is based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2002.
In chapter 2 Arnoud Muizer of EIM questions whether the growing importance of knowledge
and the knowledge infrastructure for innovation purposes is adequately reflected by an
effective and efficient use by Dutch enterprises of this external knowledge. Are the quantity
and quality of knowledge available at the institutions sufficient for innovative knowledge
demands in the private sector? Are the knowledge demands actually met? And how can this
knowledge transfer be improved? 
Chapter 3, by Marcel Kreijen and Astrid van der Laag of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, gives
more insight in the role the Dutch government could play regarding knowledge transfer
between public knowledge institutes and the private sector. Why should the government pay
attention to knowledge transfer in the first place? What role do spin-offs play in the Netherlands
and how does the Dutch government support them? Finally, the entrepreneurship policy
encouraging spin-off and technological start-ups is presented. 
Finally, Professor Alan Hughes, as said above, gives his expert view on the subject. On the
basis of the role and significance of new enterprises and high technology sectors for growth
and productivity performance in the US and the OECD, he analyses the extent and direction of
effects that can be expected from technology transfer policies targeted at new and small enter-
prises in technology based sectors. Consequently he presents the policy implications that may
be derived from university based commercialisation and spin-off policy in the USA. 
We would like to thank all authors for their contribution and their fruitful co-operation in the
project and hope you enjoy reading this booklet.
Astrid van der Laag, Ministry of Economic Affairs
Jacqueline Snijders, EIM Business & Policy ResearchEntrepreneurship in the Netherlands 8Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 9
1 Entrepreneurial activity and innovative start-ups 
in the Netherlands
By Niels Bosma, EIM Business & Policy Research
1.1 Introduction
The importance of increasing entrepreneurial activity in order to achieve economic growth is
widely propagated among politicians, policy makers and academics. Therefore, there is a
growing need to measure entrepreneurial activity, and its underlying determinants. The Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) enables to estimate and monitor entrepreneurial activity in the
Netherlands in an international context. In the frame of GEM, comparable data on entrepreneurial
activity are collected, described and analysed across a wide range of countries, in total 37
countries are involved. 
Within the broad range of entrepreneurial activities, the essential role of innovative start-ups for
economic growth is evident. First, innovative start-ups often become fast-growing enterprises
and second, new products and processes provided by innovative start-ups are input for other
(new) enterprises. According to the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, the annual number
of innovative start-ups is lagging behind in international perspective
1 and as a result, renovating
and innovating abilities in the Dutch economy are limited. This ‘bottleneck’ in the economic
development of the Dutch economy is therefore marked as a serious concern.
This chapter discusses entrepreneurial activity and in particular the role of innovative start-ups
in the Netherlands, in an international perspective: i.e., compared with Belgium, Denmark,
France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States (USA). 
Section 1.2 focuses on entrepreneurial activity in general based on GEM 2002, whereas in
section 1.3, the role of innovative start-ups is discussed. The last section provides conclusions.
1.2 Entrepreneurial activity
Entrepreneurial activity in the business start-up process 
The business start-up process consists of different phases as illustrated in figure 1. Only a small
part of the adult population (persons in the age of 18-64 years) is interested in setting up an
own enterprise (potential entrepreneurs) and only a share of them is actually involved in setting
up an enterprise (nascent entrepreneurs). If the attempts to set up an enterprise succeed, i.e.,
the enterprise is established, the entrepreneur becomes the owner of a young enterprise. 
In GEM, the entrepreneurial activity of a country is measured as the number of entrepreneurial
active persons as a percentage of the adult population. Entrepreneurially active persons are: 
i. persons involved in a start-up process (nascent entrepreneur); or 
ii. the owners and managers of a young enterprise (not older than 42 months).Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 10







































































































































Figure 2 Total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) indices, 2002 
Note: TEA is defined as number of nascent entrepreneurs and owners of young businesses per 100 individuals in the 
18-64 adult population.
Source: EIM, on the basis of GEM (2002). The vertical bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
Five out of 100 persons of the adult population are entrepreneurially active 
In figure 2 the entrepreneurial activity rate (TEA) for the countries studied in this chapter is
given. Compared to these countries the Netherlands performs about average. In 2002, the
entrepreneurial activity rate for the Netherlands is 4.6. This means that almost 5 out of 100 
persons of the adult population (in the age of 18-64 years) are entrepreneurially active. 
The (non-weighted) average rate for the 11 EU Member States participating in GEM is 5.0.
2Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 11
In the 37 countries covered by GEM more than 450 million persons are engaged in
entrepreneurial activity.
3This refers to 8% of the total adult population in these countries.
40% of the Dutch adult population are potential entrepreneurs
GEM reveals that almost 40% of the Dutch adult population are of the opinion that they have
the knowledge and skills to start-up a business. As described above, these persons are called
‘potential entrepreneurs’. This share differs a lot between countries, in the US for example
around 60% of the adult population consider themselves qualified for entrepreneurship,
whereas in France this holds only for 25%. Only a part of the potential entrepreneurs are
nascent entrepreneurs, i.e., really setting up an enterprise. Compared to the potential
entrepreneurs, nascent entrepreneurs are less averse to risk taking and perceive more
business opportunities. 
No fear of failure in the Netherlands, however failure is condemned 
In GEM special attention is paid to the risk attitude regarding entrepreneurship and the results
suggest that Dutch citizens are generally not risk aversive in this respect: only 1 out of 4
reported that fear of failure would prevent them from setting-up an enterprise. This share is
just slightly higher than in the United States, but GEM shows that in Germany and Spain 1 out
of 2 individuals would not consider entrepreneurship as a career option because of their fear
for failure. Although these results on fear of failure seem to suggest that the Dutch attitude
towards failure is fairly positive, research directed at attitudes towards actually failed
entrepreneurs gives evidence for the opposite
4.
Six out of 100 potential entrepreneurs set up an enterprise 
Of the potential entrepreneurs, only a small proportion become nascent entrepreneurs, i.e.,
really active in the process of setting up an enterprise: this holds for 6 of the 100 potential
entrepreneurs (prevalence rate in the total adult population is 2.4, see figure 3). Over at least
the past few years the share of nascent entrepreneurs in the adult population remained stable
5.
In for example Ireland and the United States the number of potential entrepreneurs becoming
nascent entrepreneur is higher than in the Netherlands. 
Only 2% of the adult population own a young enterprise
Around 2% of the Dutch adult population are owning a young enterprise (see figure 4). 
This share is higher than in France and Belgium, but again lower than in Ireland and the
United States. The low values for France and Belgium seem to be particularly caused by a
relatively low presence of young business owners in services.
In addition, 4.5% of the adult population owns an established enterprise (older than 24
months). This equals to 70% of all individuals owning enterprises. This percentage of 
established firm presence is comparable with the other EU countries but it is much higher than


























































































Figure 3 Prevalence of nascent entrepreneurs in the 19-64
population, 2002 
Note: Prevalence rate is defined as the number of individuals of setting up an enterprise per 100 adults 18-64 years.






















































































Figure 4 Prevalence of owners of young businesses in the 19-64
population, 2002
Note: Prevalence rate is defined as the number of owners of young businesses per 100 adults between 18-64 years.
Source: GEM (2002). The vertical bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 13
Opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship
Persons can start an enterprise out of necessity (for example unemployment) but also because
they see opportunities for a new enterprise. In Europe, the number of people starting an
enterprise out of necessity is rather low, although country differences do exist. Germany and
Ireland have the highest necessity entrepreneurship, and Belgium and France the lowest. The
Netherlands is somewhere in the middle. 
Decrease in entrepreneurial activity is lower than in other EU countries
In the past year, entrepreneurial activity in the Netherlands decreased. This is mainly due to the
decreasing number of young enterprises, the percentage of nascent entrepreneurs remained
the same. There are three explanations for this observed development: (i) start-up activity itself
decreased due to economic stagnation, (ii) more exits among young businesses and (iii)
nascent entrepreneurs have more difficulties to get the business started (leaving them nascent
instead of becoming owner of a young business). In most of the other European countries the
activity rate also decreased but to a higher extent, so the relative position of the Netherlands
























































































Figure 5 TEA indices in 2001 and 2002
Source: GEM 2002.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 14
1.3 Innovative start-ups
Setting up a business is one thing. Business growth is another. Research revealed that in
particular the innovative start-ups are the future gazelles, therefore an important indicator of
future growth is the involvement in innovative entrepreneurial activity. In this section, innovative
entrepreneurial activity is defined as the number of entrepreneurial active persons (i.e.,
preparing a start-up or owning of a young firm) who strive for some kind of market expansion. 
Before measuring the innovativeness of individuals who are involved in entrepreneurial
activity, various conditions influencing the measure of innovativeness among starting
entrepreneurs are dealt with in the next section.
1.3.1 Conditions for innovative start-ups in the Netherlands
Research shows that the following conditions in the business environment are crucial for the
development of innovative start-ups
6:
- Business climate in general;
- Access to finance;
- Access to skilled labour;
- Access to knowledge.
In chapter 3 of this report, special attention is paid to the access of knowledge of start-ups,
therefore in this chapter only attention is paid to the first 3 conditions. 
Business climate
There are various indicators determining the business climate of a country. Compared with the
other countries covered by this chapter, the business climate in the Netherlands is quite
favourable. In the global competitiveness index the Netherlands is ranked on the third place
among the ten considered countries, behind Finland and the United States. Focussing on
innovativeness the Netherlands score less. Figure 6 sets out the discrepancy between
competitiveness and innovation for the Netherlands. In chapter 2 of this report, more details
are provided on the innovative performance of the Netherlands in an international perspective. 
The Dutch labour market is characterized by little flexibility which puts forward the alternatives
to entrepreneurship: especially the existing pension funds provide reasons for employees to
opt for lifetime employment rather than considering entrepreneurship during their career.
The presence of regional clusters is also an important indicator for the business climate of
start-up innovativeness. A regional cluster may be defined as a geographically bounded
concentration of interdependent enterprises
7. In this, entrepreneurial and technological
activities in specific industrial sectors tend to agglomerate at certain places
8. Regional
innovation networks are special kinds of regional clusters; these networks encourage
enterprises’ innovation activity by having more organised cooperation between enterprises,
stimulated by trust, norms and conventions. Empirical research into regional clusters is still
limited. In the Netherlands, twelve large conglomerates of inter-linked industry groups were
identified using an empirical study on regional inter-industry linkages
9. However, the greatEntrepreneurship in the Netherlands 15
interest in regional clustering by policy makers demands more analyses, especially on the
relative importance of the clusters
10. 
Access to finance
In general, banks are the most important source of finance for small and medium-sized
enterprises, and the majority of SMEs get the loans they need. For starting entrepreneurs,
however, it is relatively more difficult to get bank finance and if they get a bank loan the banks
often set out stronger requirements (such as more short-term loans and more collateral for
loans)
11. Most start-ups are financed by founder‘s personal savings and by private loans
coming from family or friends
For innovative starts-ups it is even more difficult to find financial means: high-risk activities
with uncertainty on the return, long development periods of the products and services and
availability of intangible rather than tangible assets. Taking into account these characteristics, it
is obvious that bank financing is less appropriate and (informal) venture capital seems to be a
more adequate financing option. 
The informal venture capital market in the Netherlands is relatively underdeveloped. The GEM
results in 2001 and 2002 also reveal that a relatively low number of people are investing their
capital in start-ups in general. 
In addition, GEM shows that as a percentage of GDP , only the United States and Sweden have
more domestic venture capital funds available than the Netherlands
12. The Dutch venture
capital market has most resemblance with the bank-oriented system, as the stock market is














































Figure 6 Competitiveness and innovation
Source: Global Competitiveness Report. The sizes of the circles represent a measure of national culture encouraging 
















































































Figure 7 Division of domestic funds in venture capital, according to
the stage of investment (comparable data for the United States are
not available)
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Access to skilled labour
In general, lack of skilled labour is the major business constraints for SMEs
13. In particular skill
shortages (mostly for highly educated technicians, engineers, and e-business professionals)
represent one of the major barriers for innovative start-ups in finding personnel. And therefore
enterprises have to rely on internal training, which is very difficult to arrange by innovative
start-ups. 
1.3.2 Innovative start-ups in the Netherlands
Innovative entrepreneurs
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor identifies those people who are entrepreneurially active
in an innovative way: e.g., striving for market expansion. Table 1 reveals that 2 out of 10 people
involved in entrepreneurial activity believe that the product or service they offer is new to all
clients. Nascent entrepreneurs seem to judge the newness of their products higher than the
entrepreneurs do who have already started their business. The reasons for this difference might
be that nascent entrepreneurs are a bit more over-enthusiastic. They also foresee slightly fewer
competitors offering the same product. 1 out of 10 entrepreneurs claims to use the latest technology. 
Early stage: seed, start-up. Later stage: expansion, late stage. Other: replacement, turnaround, buy-out, acquisition.
Source: ECVA.
the GEM results show (see figure 7) that venture capital funds in the Netherlands do not
participate much in early stage investments. The available funds are destined for enterprises at
a later stage of the life cycle and for other purposes such as replacement, turnaround, buy-out
and acquisition.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 17
Combining the three market expansion features, two indices of market expansion are derived.
Table 2 provides an international comparison of these market expansion indices. Compared to
the other countries, the Dutch performance is modest on both indicators. Especially strong
market expansion, for which using the latest technology is a prerequisite, is non-evident in the
Netherlands.
High-potential entrepreneurs
Combining answers on market expansion, international orientation and the prospected
number of employees, one can indicate the so-called high-potential entrepreneurs. In table 3,
the high-potential entrepreneurship prevalence rates are shown. For the Netherlands, 16
percent of the individuals involved in entrepreneurial activity can be considered as high-









Product/services will be 
considered new to*
How many competitors 
offer the same products
or services?
Were the required 
technologies or methods
available one year ago?
Table 1 Market expansion features (%) for entrepreneurial active
entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, 2002
* Significant difference (95% confidence level) between nascents and owners of young enterprises.
Source: GEM 2002.
all clients 28 10 20
some clients 10 16 13
none 62 74 67
100 100 100
many 39 54 46
few 44 33 39
none 17 12 15
100 100 100
yes 89 90 89
no 11 10 11
100 100 100Note:  High potential entrepreneurship is defined as: some market expansion, some clients abroad, prospected number
of employees is 20 or higher.
Source: GEM 2002.










France 0.57 3.2 18%
Sweden 0.63 4.0 16%
Belgium 0.64 3.0 21%
Finland 0.72 4.6 16%
NETHERLANDS 0.73 4.6 16%
U.S.A. 0.81 10.5 8%
Denmark 0.96 6.5 15%
United Kingdom 0.99 5.4 18%
Germany 1.47 5.2 28%
Ireland 1.52 9.1 17%
Table 3 Prevalence of high-potential entrepreneurs
TEA index % TEA: strong 
market expansion
% TEA: some 
market expansion
U.S.A. 10.5 12% 47%
NETHERLANDS 4.6 9% 39%
Belgium 3.0 15% 44%
France 3.2 11% 33%
United Kingdom 5.4 13% 44%
Denmark 6.5 17% 55%
Sweden 4.0 13% 42%
Germany 5.2 13% 34%
Ireland 9.1 8% 40%
Finland 4.6 9% 45%
Table 2 International comparison of market expansion prevalence rates
Source: GEM 2002.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 19
1.4 Conclusion
Entrepreneurial activity is moderate but improving
The Netherlands improves in entrepreneurial activity, relative to other Western countries.
However, the level of the TEA index decreased from 2001 to 2002 and is still beyond that of
many other countries. Most people in the Netherlands are active in opportunity entrepreneur-
ship rather than necessity entrepreneurship (e.g., from an unemployment situation). 
Climate less favourable for innovative start-ups
The Dutch business climate is adequate considering general competitiveness. However, 
the Dutch culture, the labour market and the financial system could be more supportive for
innovative start-ups. As for culture, risk aversion involving setting up a business seems to 
be relatively low. However, the Dutch culture seems to be still not very supportive to
entrepreneurs who actually failed. The labour market is characterized by little flexibility that
puts forward the alternatives to entrepreneurship. As a consequence, (innovative)
entrepreneurship is less attractive. Moreover, the availability of skilled labour required to make
innovative start-ups a success has been a problem in the past few years. Considering finance,
most venture capital funds are directed to later stage investments, expansion, turnaround or
buyout; rather than to early stages. 
Limited number of innovative start-ups in the Netherlands
From an internationally comparable self-assessment of market expansion (determined by
newness of product, perceived level of competition) by people involved in entrepreneurial
activities, we can conclude that the Netherlands is somewhat behind when it comes down to
the number of innovative start-ups. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 20
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2 Knowledge transfer
By Arnoud Muizer, EIM Business & Policy Research
2.1 Introduction
Given the growing international competition, enterprises have to apply themselves on
inventing new products, services and processes and they have to distinct themselves from
their competitors through innovative behaviour. The growing need for innovations as an
instrument to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises increases the importance of
knowledge needed for the development of innovations.
The knowledge infrastructure is an important source of scientific insights developed on
assignment of enterprises or autonomously by universities and research institutes. Demand
for these scientific insights is increasing. Not only due to growing innovation needs in order to
keep up with the intensifying competition, but also due to the fact that enterprises are
increasingly focussing on core competences leading to a growing need amongst enterprises to
outsource fundamental research. 
Against this background, knowledge transfer between knowledge institutions and private
parties is becoming increasingly important as a channel for matching knowledge supply and
demand
1.
The question is whether the growing importance of knowledge and of the knowledge
infrastructure for innovation purposes is also visible in an effective and efficient use by
enterprises of external knowledge from publicly financed institutions, such as research
institutes and universities. Related questions in this respect are: are the quantity and quality of
knowledge available at the institutions sufficient for innovative knowledge demands in the
private sector and, if so, are the diffusion and transfer of this knowledge satisfactory for all 
- public and private - parties so that knowledge demands are actually met? If the answer to
these questions is negative, the question is raised why possible obstacles in matching supply
and demand occur and which actions could be undertaken to solve the problems encountered.
In order to answer these questions, the setting should be made clear. Insights are necessary
regarding different types of knowledge, different channels of knowledge transfer and the
definition of knowledge transfer. These issues will be elaborated in the next section. From
section 2.3 on, the questions raised will be answered. In section 2.3, the international position
of the Netherlands regarding knowledge and the transfer of knowledge is described. Section
2.4 focuses on the knowledge used in the market. In section 2.5, strengths, weaknesses and
possible actions for solving any knowledge-related problems are described. 
In this chapter, our focus will be primarily on innovative start-ups. It should be remarked
though that it is not always possible to specify the particular knowledge-related problems for
this group. It can be stated, however, that most of the problems encountered in this chapter
especially apply to SMEs which intend to make use of externally available knowledge.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 22
2.2 Knowledge types and transfer
Different types of knowledge
Knowledge has some specific characteristics. Firstly, knowledge is hardly measurable.
Secondly, knowledge can be transferred from one person to another person, but the original
owner of the knowledge will not lose the knowledge. Because of this, knowledge is called a
non-rivalry good. Thirdly, knowledge is cumulative, i.e., if one wishes to absorb new
knowledge one should at least have already an adequate base of knowledge.
Knowledge can be categorized in different ways. Jacobs
2 introduced the following
categorization of knowledge:
- Technological knowledge, or knowledge about technical processes, about new materials,
about how to organize product ideas and production processes technically efficient, etc.
- Market knowledge, or knowledge about developments within the market and with-
in sub-markets and knowledge about how to organize the firm’s services in such a way that
clients are linked up with the firm permanently.
- Organizational knowledge or knowledge about how to get teams to cooperate, about how to
cooperate with external parties, about how to mobilize knowledge and ideas within the
enterprise, etc.
- Human and social skills, or personality, entrepreneurship, and leadership and team skills.
In this chapter, the focus will be on the first type of knowledge: ‘Technological knowledge’. For
most innovative start-ups, hard technological knowledge forms the basis for their product and
process innovations. It should be stated, however, that beside the technological aspects also
non-technological aspects such as strategy, marketing and cooperation, are increasingly
recognised as important critical success factors for these types of innovations.
3
Definition of knowledge transfer
The focus of this chapter will be on the transfer of technological knowledge from public
knowledge institutions to SMEs and more specifically to innovative start-ups. As such,
knowledge transfer fits into the definition of Carlsonn and Fridh:
Technology transfer may occur in the following forms:
1 Scientific and technical journal articles: The publication of research results in
scientific journals and books is the most common form of knowledge dissemination.
2 Commercialisation of intellectual property: In some cases, the transfer may
occur only if the intellectual property is protected and then commercialised. 
The B&A-groep
4 distinguishes three different types of exploiting intellectual property by
public institutions:
Patents or licences: The knowledge transfer from institutions to industry may take the form
of patents or licences.
Public-private partnerships: The institutions may participate with private parties in
The transfer of the results of research from the institutions to the commercial sector. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 23
partnerships or separate ventures with the aim to exploit the publicly financed knowledge.
Start-ups and spin-offs: Publicly financed knowledge may also be exploited by start-ups by
researchers and graduates. These start-ups use recently developed knowledge within the
institutions as a substantial element for their activities
5.
3 Ad hoc knowledge transfer: For improvements in products and productions
processes, knowledge needs may arise which cannot be met in the enterprise itself. In these
cases, enterprises will try to get or buy the necessary knowledge externally. For this
purpose, about 10% of the SMEs contact public knowledge institutions
6. 
Diverse role for innovative start-ups in knowledge transfer
Given this definition, the role of innovative start-ups is diverse with respect to knowledge
transfer. In their start-up stage, innovative start-ups commercialise intellectual property
available at knowledge institutes and are therefore a transfer channel themselves. Often the
commercialisation of intellectual property through spin-offs is formalised in patent
agreements. After the start-up stage and being innovative entrepreneurs, they have knowledge
needs which they will try to retrieve from the institutes.
2.3 Performance of the Netherlands
In this section, the performance of the Netherlands regarding knowledge transfer is assessed.
Since knowledge needs to be created first before it can be transferred, also attention will be
paid to the performance of the Netherlands in R&D.
Knowledge transfer is considered a serious weakness
From the GEM Survey 2002 it appears that knowledge transfer is considered a serious
weakness in the Netherlands. While on average 3.5% of the respondents in the GEM Survey
7
perceives knowledge transfer as a weakness, the corresponding score for the Netherlands is
15%. After ‘social norms, culture and education & training’, knowledge transfer is considered
the most important weakness. See also chapter 1 of this report.
The question is if the perception of this weakness is also visible in national and international
statistics. In order to get a clear picture of the quantity and quality of the knowledge transfer in
the Netherlands in comparison with other countries, some insights in knowledge-related
statistics are necessary. 
R&D-statistics indicate: relatively low level of private R&D
The satisfaction with direct knowledge transfer is expected to depend on the quantity of R&D
with a distinction between government and privately financed R&D, on the quality of the know-
ledge to be transferred, and on the quality of knowledge-transfer channels. From figure 8 it
appears that the production of scientific and technical journal articles is above average if com-
pared with other countries. In the Netherlands, on average 70 articles are produced per 100,000
people, which is well above average. Switzerland, however, is far ahead with a ratio equalling 95.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 24
Also government expenditure on R&D shows an above average score for the Netherlands.
Public R&D expenditure equals a percentage of 0.35% of GDP , which is above the average of

























































































Figure 8 Scientific and technical journal articles per 100,000 people, 1997
























































































Figure 9 Government R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP , 1997
Source: OECD, Main Science Technology Indicators.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 25
These relatively positive signs, however, are not reflected in the private R&D-expenditure.
Private R&D-expenditure in the Netherlands is relatively low as is demonstrated in figure 10. It
is lagging far behind the averages in the EU and the OECD. 
Patent statistics demonstrate: relatively high score on patents granted, but not for public
institutions and SMEs
The number of patents awarded or asked for could be another indicator for the R&D level in
the Netherlands, and the size and quantity of knowledge transfer. Several patent statistics
demonstrate a relatively high score on patents granted, but this is mainly attributable to a
small proportion of - often large - enterprises. 
Looking at the total number of patents granted, public institutions only account for a small
share of total patents applied for. In the 1990s, universities applied for 223 patents, which is
less than 2% of the total number of patents. It is emphasised, however, that the number of
patents is not the only indicator of the performance of universities in the field of knowledge
transfer. Also university co-inventions and patent citations of university research are important
indicators in this respect.
8
Degree of public-private collaboration seems to be low
In a study that focused on research-dependent patents, it was concluded that about 10% of the
company patents were realised in partnerships with Dutch universities. This seems to be rather













































































































Figure 10 Business expenditure in R&D as a percentage of GDP , 1999
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, World Development Indicators 2001.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 26
Growth sectors statistics demonstrate a low start-up ratio
Innovative spin-offs from knowledge institutions are considered very important for the vitality
of the Dutch economy. They play an important role as regards the creation and dissemination
of knowledge. Their products have substantial added value and are a major factor in the
commercialisation of publicly developed knowledge.
10
EIM has reviewed the start-up ratio in growth sectors, e.g., the number of start-ups and new
subsidiaries in relation with the total number of enterprises. Since these growth sectors
contain many innovative start-ups, benchmarking the start-up ratio in these sectors provides
an indication of general innovative start-up activity in the Netherlands. It appears that the
dynamism of innovative entrepreneurship in the Netherlands is lagging behind compared to
Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, relatively few
enterprises start up in rapidly growing sectors.
11 
2.4 Knowledge use and demand
In this section, insights are provided in demand and use of knowledge by enterprises. This will
help to further visualise the functioning of knowledge transfer in the Netherlands.
Most enterprises cannot operate without external knowledge
An EIM survey in 2002 amongst nascents (pre-starters), start-ups and incumbent enterprises
revealed that 45% of the nascents retrieve technological knowledge from outside the company.
The corresponding percentages of start-ups and incumbent enterprises are 67 and 56%,
respectively. This indicates that all types of enterprises cannot operate solely, but do depend
for their internal operations on external technological know-how.
Educational institutions are the most important source for start-ups
From a study by EIM
12 in 1999 it appears that the greater part of the external knowledge that
SMEs absorb, is acquired from other enterprises: suppliers, colleagues and competitors or
from clients. Only to a minor degree, SMEs utilize the knowledge infrastructure for acquiring
knowledge. The dominance of other enterprises as a source of technological knowledge is to a
certain extent also visible in 2002. Generally spoken, other enterprises including competitors,
suppliers and customers are important sources of the needed technological knowledge. 
A breakdown by different types of enterprises, however, reveals that for start-ups and
incumbent enterprises, educational institutions seem to be the most important source: about
25% of the start-ups and incumbent enterprises get their knowledge from these institutions
13.
Research institutes are not mentioned frequently: only about 3% of all enterprises use the
institutions as a knowledge source. 
Character of the contacts between SMEs and publicly financed knowledge institutions
SMEs that do use publicly financed knowledge often have contacts with more than one of the
following categories of institutions: universities, higher educational institutions and
technological institutions.
14 In all cases, the relationships between enterprises and publicEntrepreneurship in the Netherlands 27
knowledge institutions include concrete contacts about research or knowledge transfer. These
may emerge in the form of collaboration, in project assignments or in the answering of
concrete questions. As is shown in figure 11, about 15% of the SMEs are in discussion about or
establishing licensing agreements. It should be noted that the group of SMEs in the survey
already had contacts with the institutions before the research was effected. If translated to the
total enterprise population, the latter percentage would probably fall to 1-2%. 
collaboration for solving research- or
development issues







looking for general information
training, course
10% 0% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Figure 11 Character of the relationship between SMEs and public
knowledge institutions
Source: EIM, Toegankelijkheid van publieke kennisinstellingen, Zoetermeer, 2000.
2.5 Strengths and weaknesses
2.5.1 Introduction
In section 2.3, it has already been mentioned that knowledge transfer is considered a relatively
important weakness in the Netherlands. In this section, arguments for the occurrence of this
weakness are discussed. In order to do so, strengths and weaknesses regarding knowledge
transfer in the Netherlands are described into detail. In face-to-face interviews with experts
carried out by EIM, in-depth analyses have been made with respect to the causes of perceived
strengths and weaknesses. In addition, EIM has carried out additional desk research in this
field. The results from both interviews and desk research form the basis for the description
and further elaboration of the strengths and weaknesses regarding knowledge transfer. In the
interviews, the question has also been raised which actions could be undertaken to improve
the situation and to take away any bottlenecks. Actions and suggestions for improvement are
interwoven in the section. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 28
2.5.2 Analysis of the problem
The fundamentals are present
The infrastructure, consisting of research institutes and universities enabling technology
transfer, is fairly good. Also the knowledge level is satisfactory. In addition, sufficient public
R&D means are available, the R&D experiments and R&D projects are very valuable and a
wide-ranging intermediary network exists with good-quality banks, accountants and advisory
agencies. Innovative start-ups can easily get all types of advice, including technical advice from
institutions such as TNO and Senter. It can therefore be concluded that the fundaments for
effective knowledge transfer are present.
The translation of fundamental research into new products and services is insufficient
The quality and quantity of scientific research seem to be sufficient in the Netherlands.
Problems arise with the translation of knowledge into new innovative products and services.
As a consequence, the scientific experiments, which can be considered a strength in the
Netherlands, do not result in practical applications and the knowledge diffusion is sub-optimal. 
2.5.3 Patents are under-utilized as a channel for knowledge transfer
Universities do not focus on knowledge protection through patenting
The production of patents of Dutch universities is relatively weak if compared with UK
universities and, for instance, the University of Leuven. This is partly due to the financing
system and the limitation that regular funds may not be applied for the protection and
exploitation of knowledge. Although patenting would stimulate the sales to third parties and
the development of spin-offs, and has as such an important public function for the
Netherlands, the advantages of doing so do not completely cover the disadvantages in terms
of relatively high costs and long and complex procedures. As a result, the importance of
universities attached to knowledge protection through patenting is rather low. This is
demonstrated in a lack of uniformity in patent policies of universities and in a lack of alertness
on potential intellectual property.
15
Also SMEs do not protect their knowledge sufficiently
Enterprises make a cost-benefit analysis with respect to their decision to apply for a patent or
not. For innovative start-ups and enterprises, the protection of their often unique knowledge is
very important. Patent application costs, however, are high for SMEs and for innovative start-
ups. In addition, it is often not completely clear which protection is really offered. These are
arguments for many SMEs not to apply. Over 40% of the high-tech SMEs do not apply for
patents.
16The arrival of the Community-patent could have cost-reducing effects, because
enterprises can protect their knowledge within the entire community with one single patent.
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2.5.4 Public-private interactions need to be stimulated as channels 
for knowledge transfer
A gap and conflict of interest between public knowledge institutions and enterprises
For efficient and effective knowledge transfer it is necessary that public knowledge institutions
and enterprises can find each other in order to come to win-win situations. There seems to be
a gap and a serious conflict of interest between the public and private parties. The conflicting
interests are visible in: 
- Friction between the quality of the research at the institutions and the demand for short-
term results of the market parties.
- The emphasis on fundamental knowledge at the institutions, which can not be directly
transferred into new products. This is the reason why institutions have problems finding
clients for their available knowledge.
- Insufficient awareness amongst enterprises for the wishes of the institutions to publish the
results of their scientific research. 
- A gap between the termination of a project and the willingness of the market to take over
patents and licences.
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The conflicting interests result in poor networking and interaction between institutions and
enterprises. Besides the conflicting interests, also a cultural gap seems to exist between public
and private parties.
Currently, public knowledge institutions have a large degree of freedom with respect to the
programming of R&D. In accordance with their prime scientific interests, institutions are too
much curiosity-driven and too less demand-driven. As a consequence, Dutch universities are
too much focussed on fundamental scientific research and not on the practical applications of
their knowledge. A better balance between the two motives should be found.
The autonomy is too high and the third financial source is almost exclusively generated from
large enterprises. In practice, there is hardly any faculty with university teachers, which are
also problem solvers for SMEs. If it happens, it is on the initiative of the university staff not
because it fits in the R&D policy of the faculty. 
‘Dutch scientists have the idea that collaboration automatically leads to giving away the
scientific content and character of their research. The dominant culture is very defensive. 
The other end of the balance ‘everything at your disposal’ is also wrong.’
‘The problem is that knowledge is not primarily developed to be transferred and, as a
consequence, the knowledge which is developed at universities is not tailor-made for
practical applications.’
‘One man day for consultancy of a professor could help solving a technical problem for
an SME which would cost about € 50.000 otherwise.’Public-private interaction should also be visible in the educational programmes
Technical students, who are potential innovative start-ups, often lack the marketing skills
necessary for a successful market introduction of new products. This means that educational
programmes at universities must pay more attention to the commercialisation of knowledge.
At this point, however, the imbalance appears, since the emphasis of the university as a whole
is often not on the commercialisation and practical applications of knowledge. Besides finding
the right balance in R&D policies, professors at universities should also be aware of the fact
that knowledge can and must be commercialised. If so, the educational level of entrepreneurs
can be improved with a specific focus on strategy development and marketing. Entrepreneurs
should develop a long-term perspective with a strategic focus on innovation and co-operation
with relevant parties. Through training and education of the entrepreneurs and the employees,
they are better able to articulate their knowledge demands. At the same time, universities
should become more demand-driven and that is the big challenge for the coming period. 
Interactive forums would stimulate knowledge transfer
The interview results indicate that technical universities do not communicate sufficiently with
SMEs. In addition, technological institutions such as TNO are too much focussed on large
enterprises. These enterprises have more financial means and these are not available in SMEs.
TNO is also too big and too diverse to focus on SMEs effectively. Many SMEs, however, are
very interesting potential technology partners, since they are often specialized, internationally
operating niche players. Discussing about new technologies and R&D-programmes from
scratch is important though, since large amounts to invest are not available for small enter-
prises. Also SMEs should know which technologies are interesting or will become so. With a
good and interactive setting, it would be possible to form new, successful technology-market
combinations. Initiatives exist to stimulate the development of such combinations structurally. 
The government should facilitate and support contacts between the knowledge institutions and
the market parties. Bringing parties together provides the right fundaments for picking up
activities in a well-structured manner. Especially, due to the conflicting interests of institutions
and enterprises, the government should create a ‘bridging function’ between public and
private parties.
Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 30
‘Especially technical universities should pay more attention to the development of
entrepreneurial skills so that commercial success for new product development in
university spin-offs is better guaranteed.’ 
‘Government (central and local) should supply (still) better facilities to businesses, further
improving the ‘one-stop-shop’ concept, for example by appointing personal consultants
that business can call upon.’Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 31
Universities and technological instittions can learn from each other
From the interviews it can be concluded that universities and technological institutions may
learn from each other. The major weakness of technological institutions seems to be the R&D
programming, whereas the major weakness of universities is the lack of interaction and
collaboration between science and business. 
2.5.5 Spin-offs are under-utilized as a channel for knowledge transfer
One of the main channels for knowledge transfer from universities to enterprises is formed by
start-ups from universities. The number of start-ups is lagging behind other countries.
According to the interviewees, there is lack of an overall spin-off policy and most Dutch
universities are rooted in traditional values. Furthermore, the existing regulations are not
favourable for the settlement of spin-offs and for adequate breeding and seeding facilities. 
The most important bottleneck for the development, stimulation and facilitation of innovative
spin-offs is the fact that universities do not see the public nor their own interest in stimulating
spin-offs. This lack of interest is visible in insufficient preparing of students for
entrepreneurship, but also in a lack amongst students and researchers for time, experience
and start-up capital. The most important bottlenecks for spin-offs are: 
- A lack of management experience amongst graduates.
- A lack of entrepreneurial skills and expertise.
- Conflicts with the university about intellectual property rights.
- Access to financial markets.
- Marketing and getting access to the market.
- The general entrepreneurial climate, bureaucracy, etc.
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Spin-off activity could be stimulated if more science parks are available
Spin-offs are often looking for business space on science parks. Networking contacts are
considered one of the most important advantages of a science park.
20 With respect to these
networking contacts, the following elements are important:
- The transfer of people from the institution to the enterprises.
- Knowledge transfer.
- Contract or sponsored research within the university by researchers and students.
‘Technological institutions need to be better organised. The concept of collaborating
scientists and clusters of enterprises is present in principal, but the R&D programming
could be improved. Furthermore, the governmental initiative to establish new
technological top institutes needs to be continued.’
‘More uniformity in university policies is a way to stimulate innovative spin-offs. 
Once the rules and conditions with respect to knowledge and patent ownership and
patent income are clear for students and university scientists and more uniform, this will
stimulate spin-offs from universities.’Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 32
- Contract development, design, analysis, testing, evaluation, etc.
- Access to all facilities of the university
- More informal interaction with academics.
21
Sufficient business space at science parks would create conditions for stimulating networking
contacts and knowledge transfer.
2.5.6 Quality of the direct channel for knowledge transfer
A good overview of knowledge supply is lacking
According to innovative SMEs, the customer orientation and accessibility of public knowledge
institutions are satisfactory. A clear and detailed overview of available knowledge at
institutions, however, is lacking. In some cases, also the price of knowledge is too high.
This impedes the public application of fundamental knowledge.
22
Sector-wise organised networks could stimulate direct knowledge transfer
Also intermediary organisations are lacking the necessary overview.
23 The problem with
sectoral organisations in general is that they need to carry out activities for all their members.
Technological knowledge is often only interesting for the more innovative enterprises amongst
their members. As a consequence, knowledge transfer does not have a priority for these
organisations. Sector-wise oriented and organised networks could, however, stimulate
knowledge transfer by the application of ICT- and knowledge transfer points. Financial
participation of the relevant members and the sectoral organisation itself is considered a must.
This is also true for individual projects of enterprises. Financial participation enhances the
interest. This needs to be done on a project basis, implying that the project office will be ended
as soon as the initiatives are working. Currently, too many institutions are artificially kept alive.
2.5.7  Attitudes and skills
For an efficient and effective knowledge transfer, the relevant persons from both public and
private parties need to possess the necessary attitudes and skills.
Innovative start-ups are expected to possess the right attitudes and skills
From a study by Technopolis,
24 it appears that some SMEs are not able to come to a good
articulation of demands, which hinders effective knowledge transfer to these SMEs. Such
bottlenecks seem to coincide with the innovativeness and with the size of enterprises. The most
innovative enterprises are not or hardly confronted with internal bottlenecks. They have the
technological expertise to articulate their knowledge demands clearly and effectively and are
‘Support and facilities for technology transfer to SMEs should be improved. A way to
stimulate R&D transfer is to make the knowledge supply better accessible, for instance by
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further able to organize and structure their search activities. Specific for this group is the organi-
sation of internal knowledge sharing. This problem does not seem to exist for small innovative
start-ups. The general manager is often the entrepreneur who has the overview of the internally
available knowledge and who is perfectly able to articulate external knowledge demands. 
The only danger in such an organisation is a too high dependency on only one person.
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The attitude and skills of scientific personnel, however, could be improved
Knowledge transfer can be stimulated if universities would adopt more scientific personnel
who have one-to-one contacts with entrepreneurs and who are part of informal networks 
with representatives from enterprises, intermediate organisations and government bodies. 
This would mean another type of person who is willing and able to participate in these
networks and to have good feeling with the market. Scientists should interact dynamically 
with enterprises and contribute to new concepts and visions in pre-competitive settings with
clusters of enterprises and scientists. 
It is difficult to change the people currently active at universities, it would be more effective 
to recruit people with such capabilities. However, some change in the attitude of current
personnel can be realised by - for instance - considering knowledge transfer as a public
responsibility of universities. This would be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient
condition to stimulate R&D transfer. 
It is important that scientists, entrepreneurs and people in general look further than their own
daily business. They should step aside and look with an objective and critical view at their
activities and the system in which these activities are taking place. Successful entrepreneurs
and scientists are capable of thinking in new systems and in the innovation of systems.
Important in this respect is that employees who are capable and willing of doing so will get the
opportunity from their employers. In a next step, the employees should be willing to take risks
and to benefit from their own ideas, which could result in start-ups.
Win-wins need to be created, the market needs to be invited
Structural solutions cannot be forced to improve knowledge transfer. The occurrence of the
knowledge transfer weakness can almost completely be explained by an attitudinal problem of
the ones who possess the knowledge. The real solution therefore lies in the realisation of a
change of attitudes.
26
Attitudes can only change and win-wins can only be established if common interests of public
knowledge institutions and enterprises can be formulated or created. For instance, it is
currently not in the prime interest of universities to disseminate knowledge through transfer
‘Technological knowledge transfer is a continuous process of interaction: 
innovation = communication.’
‘It’s the people that must be willing and able of doing so.’Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 34
channels other than the publication of scientific articles. The public use of their knowledge
should therefore become and be made more important for the universities. 
Since the institutions possess the knowledge, the most ideal situation would be that they
should invite the market to collaborate on the commercialisation and transfer of this
knowledge in order to reach win-wins. Inviting does not only mean that the institutions should
contact the market proactively. It also means, and this is more important, that market parties
including potential entrepreneurs will not find a closed door when entering the building. An
open, inviting attitude is the first step. Collaboration in working out proposals and R&D
programmes, helping to answer questions and to stimulate innovative spin-offs are the next
related steps. 
2.6 Summary
The focus of this chapter is on the transfer of technological knowledge from public knowledge
institutions to SMEs, and more specifically to innovative start-ups. The role of innovative start-
ups is diverse with respect to knowledge transfer. In their start-up stage, innovative start-ups
commercialise intellectual property available at the knowledge institutes and are therefore a
transfer channel themselves. Often the commercialisation of intellectual property through spin-
offs is formalised in patent agreements, another transfer channel. After the start-up stage and
being innovative entrepreneurs, they have knowledge needs which they will try to retrieve
from public knowledge institutions (ad hoc knowledge transfer).
From the GEM Survey 2002 it appears that knowledge transfer is considered a serious
weakness in the Netherlands; 15% of the Dutch respondents in the GEM Survey perceive
knowledge transfer as a weakness. This weakness is also visible in national and international
statistics; private R&D is relatively low, public institutions and SMEs are lagging behind in
international patent figures, the degree of public-private collaborations seems low in the
Netherlands and the relatively innovative growth sectors show low start-up ratios for our
country. 
From the interviews and from earlier executed studies it can be concluded though that the
fundamentals are right. The levels of knowledge and of public R&D are sufficient and a wide-
ranging intermediary network exists. The problem, however, lies in the translation of
fundamental research into practical applications. A conflict of interests seems to be the main
cause for the poor interaction between public knowledge institutions and enterprises. 
In order to stimulate knowledge and of public use of knowledge, common-interests public and
private parties should be formulated or created. In that case, also win-wins can b created and
necessary attitudinal changes can be effectuated so that the market can be invited to use the
knowledge available at the institutions.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 35
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3 Spin-offs as a bridge between two worlds; 
a policy perspective
By Marcel Kreijen and Astrid van der Laag, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs
3.1 Introduction
The Netherlands has the ambition to become one of the frontrunners in Europe when it comes
to the knowledge economy. Thus there must be an optimal balance between knowledge
creation and utilisation. Especially the latter seems to be a problem in the Netherlands because
of hampering knowledge transfer from the public funded academic sector to the private sector.
In this chapter attention will be paid to academic spin-offs, since these enterprises can bridge
the gap between fundamental research and commercialising innovative products. 
In the first chapter, Niels Bosma already gave some background information about innovative
start-ups. He presented the results of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2002 
- a broad international benchmark of entrepreneurial activity - and gave insight in the Dutch
Entrepreneurial Activity Rate (TEA) in an international perspective. In 2002 there has been a
decrease of the entrepreneurial activity due to a decline in number of young enterprises,
although this decline is less than in other EU-countries.
A smooth knowledge transfer to start-up companies can be helpful to increase the activity rate.
And in chapter 2 Arnoud Muizer gave a usefull overview of the specific knowledge-related
problems of innovative start-ups. Furthermore he gave some possible solutions to strengthen
the transfer of knowledge from public research institutes to SMEs and in particular to
knowledge based start-ups. 
This chapter focuses on the policy side of the issue. We will describe the role the Dutch
government could play. In the first section we focus on the relevance of the issue: why should
the government pay attention to knowledge transfer in the first place? The direct exploitation
of research results by creating spin-offs is one way among the variety of channels by which
academic knowledge can be transferred to the business sector industry. In the following
section we will take a closer look at the phenomenon spin-offs and spin-off stimulation in the
Netherlands. Dutch actions in this field are put in an international perspective. Furthermore, we
have take a look at the problem areas in the Dutch spin-off and technology-based start-up
climate. As we will make clear, there is hardly any difference in the barriers for spin-offs and
technology-based start-ups. Therefore, spin-offs will be seen as a subset of the latter. In the last
section the entrepreneurship policy for the coming years to encourage spin-off and
technological start-ups is presented. This policy is (at time of publication) still ‘under
construction’, which means that the ministry is gathering third party comments to finetune the
foreseen policy. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 38
3.2 Dutch paradox
It is commonly known that the Netherlands is confronted with a low degree of interaction
between the research sector and the business sector. This is the so-called Dutch paradox; high
quality academic research (top ten of the world), but only limited utilisation of academic
knowledge.
1
The public funded research is not only high in terms of quality but also in quantity, compared
to private R&D-investments. Public spending on R&D as part of GNP is relatively high in the
Netherlands. Only Finland outruns the Netherlands in this matter (see table 3.1). 
As we put the figures in another way, as shown in table 3.2, it can be seen that the Netherlands
has the lowest share of private R&D-financing and the highest share of public financed R&D.
Compared to the US, the ratio is completely different. (NL 50:50 versus USA 25:75).
Also a CBS-study pointed in this direction: “R&D intensity in the Dutch public sector (0.88%)
–research institutes and universities – is on average clearly higher than in EU (0.65%) and
OECD countries (0.67%). In contrast to the strong position of the public sector in R&D, there is
the fact that in spite of the rise in 1999, private R&D (intensity: 1.14%) is traditionally low
compared to the EU (1.28%) averages and the OECD (1.54%)” .
2
Furthermore, the GEM Survey of this year mentioned the Dutch weakness of knowledge
transfer, as can be read in chapter 1. According to the GEM, the lack of knowledge transfer via
technological start-ups is one of the major weaknesses of the Dutch entrepreneurial climate.
Table 3.1 R&D spending as % of GDP (2002) 
Source: European Trendchart on Innovation 2002




USA FIN B D UK DK F NL EU
0.66% 0.98% 0.56% 0.72% 0.66% 0.75% 0.77% 0.88% 0.67%
2.04% 2.68% 1.45% 1.80% 1.21% 1.32% 1.36% 1.14% 1.28%
2.70% 3.66% 2.01% 2.52% 1.87% 2.07% 2.13% 2.02% 1.95%
Table 3.2 R&D spending Public versus Private
Public
Private
USA FIN B D UK DK F NL EU
24% 27% 28% 29% 35% 36% 36% 44% 35%
76% 73% 72% 71% 65% 64% 64% 56% 65%Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 39
One of the underlying problems is the non-transparency of support programmes for innovative
entrepreneurs.
3
As knowledge is the key to innovation and innovation on its turn leads to higher labour
productivity and welfare there is a need to improve knowledge transfer to overcome the
paradox.
4 One way to improve this transfer is via spin-off stimulation. In the next section we
will take a closer look at the phenomenon spin-offs.
3.3 Defining spin-offs 
There are many definitions of the term spin-off. Recently, EIM undertook some research on this
subject.
5 In their view spin-offs have some common aspects:
- Making use of specific knowledge or competences built up within the parent company;
- Support from the parent company (financial, time, making use of facilities, guaranteed
turnover, etc.);
- Independence (largely) from the parent company.
But EIM also concludes that there is not one common definition to be given for the term spin-
off. There seems, according to EIM, to be a broad spectrum of relevant types of spin-offs, from
innovative employees, via intrapreneurs to independent entrepreneurs. 
Because of this broad spectrum, the Ministry of Economic Affairs carried out a literature survey
to get a better grip on the subject.
6 This survey led to the conclusion that there are hundreds of
publications on spin-offs and that there are even more definitions of spin-offs.
Nevertheless, the survey of the ministry identified a number of common characteristics from
the various definitions of which the most important are: 
- The companies are new;
- There must be a ‘parent institution’ out of which the spin-off evolves; 
- This ‘evolving’ concerns the transfer of knowledge and/or technology. 
Putting all the common elements together, the following definition (which is used by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs in its policies) can be given: 
Knowledge is the focal point of the definition. This knowledge must be of crucial importance
for the start of the company, which means that the start-up would not exist without the
availability of this knowledge. Furthermore, this knowledge is the link between the spin-off and
the research institute. The way in which knowledge is transferred to the spin-off can differ, from
licensing technology on the one hand to the research employee in person on the other. By the
term ‘new company’ we refer to start-ups not older than five years.
“A spin-off from a research institution is a new company that uses recently obtained know-
ledge, developed at a research institution, as a substantial contribution to the start-up” .Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 40
In other words, a spin-off is a start-up that has its roots in a research institution. The typical
spin-off entrepreneur is a researcher who works at a research institution but wants to set up
his own business. He (or she) wants to take on the challenge of commercialising a
technological invention. But a potential entrepreneur from outside the research institute 
(not an employee of the institute) who intends to start a business on the basis of intellectual
property of the research institution (a patent for example) is also included by the above
mentioned definition.
3.4  Importance of spin-offs
As said before transfer of knowledge from the academic world to industry is hampering.
Indirectly this delays the innovation process. Since spin-offs contribute to the rapid diffusion 
of new technologies in the private sector, the creation of spin-offs stimulates the innovation
process. As the OECD puts it: “The role they play in national innovation systems is a key one,
that of intermediary, translator and catalyst. ”
7 Furthermore, spin-offs provide the necessary
flexibility without being locked in trajectories from the past like larger companies are. This
flexibility, their knowledge of the latest technology and the fact that they often work on the
development of totally new products, has led to an increasing interest by large companies in
spin-off companies. In doing so spin-offs form a bridge between research institutions and
industry. 
Since spin-off companies mostly settle close to their ‘parent institution’, spin-off stimulation
plays an important role in regional development. They offer high–quality employment and are
clients and suppliers of the established companies. The success stories of regions like Silicon
Valley and Cambridge are some of the examples on the contribution by spin-offs to regional
development. 
Spin-off creation also has positive effects on the parent institute. By creating spin-offs a
research institute becomes closer to the market, which will give the institute new insights for
fundamental research. “Through the contact with the market the education becomes more
realistic and research is timed to the needs of society. Contract research and contract teaching
become welcome additions to the university budgets” . 
8 Furthermore, spinning out companies
will improve the reputation of the research institute, which attracts more students and
researchers because of the alternative career options. 
3.5 Spin-offs and spin-off stimulation in the Netherlands
Very recently Top Spin International conducted, on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
an international benchmark on spin-offs from research institutions. The purpose of the study
was to find out how Dutch public research institutions - universities and other public research
institutions - are involved in the commercialisation of knowledge through spin-offs. The study
embraced 14 universities and 15 other research institutions in the Netherlands. The Dutch
situation was put into an international perspective by benchmarking against spin-off practices
at seven foreign universities and against national spin-off policy in those countries. These
countries were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 41
Although the Netherlands is lagging behind concerning the number of spin-offs, this does not
mean that Dutch research institutions do not take the topic seriously. A majority of the
institutes consider it important to stimulate spin-offs: 71% of the universities and 60% of the
other public research institutions (compared to 85% of the foreign institutions). 
This importance is reflected by the volume of organised spin-off stimulation activities by the
research institutes. The most frequently occurring activities are: 
- Provision of support through management advice; 
- Contacts through networks of entrepreneurs;
- Availability of incubator accommodation; 
- Utilisation of patents and licences; 
- Use of technical facilities. 
Spin-off policy was found to be evolving, with work in progress at 52% of the Dutch research
institutions on plans for new activities to support spin-offs. The most important new activities
concerned are: 
- Development of a science park; 
- Tracing of inventions with spin-off potential. 
Research institutes mention numerous reasons for stimulating spin-offs as can be seen in 
table 3.3. 
Until recently there was great diversity in the number of spin-offs. The estimates varied from
30 till 1200 on a yearly basis. The benchmark has produced new insights in terms of the
number of spin-offs in the Netherlands. The benchmark found that the number of spin-offs
initiated yearly at the 29 research institutions is 107. The average at the Dutch universities is 6.4
spin-offs per year compared to 1.3 at the other public research institutions. Compared to the
benchmark countries the Netherlands is lagging behind; the examined foreign universities
produced 7.1 spin-offs on a yearly basis. A probable explanation for this could be the fact that
the research institutes abroad are bigger than the institutes in the Netherlands. But even if we
correct for the size of the institute, by expressing the annual number of spin-offs per 1000
employees or per 100 million turnover (spin-off index), the Netherlands is still lagging behind
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Figure 3.1 Spin-off indices of public research institutions
Source: International Benchmark TSIEntrepreneurship in the Netherlands 42
So the motivations of Dutch institutions and those abroad are broadly the same. Though
looking at the above mentioned figure it springs to attention that in other countries the
argument of stimulating the market orientation of the institute is of much bigger importance in
the benchmark countries than it is in the Netherlands. 
Research institutes also face disadvantages of promoting spin-offs. The most important for the
Dutch institutes are: 
- The financial and legal risks;
- Spin-offs are at the expense of the primary activities of education and research;
- A lack of the expertise and time required to stimulate spin-offs;
- Loss of good employees.
Financial and legal risks and the loss of good employees are not considered to be a
disadvantage in the benchmark countries at all. An external factor in the Netherlands is that
the legal definition of the tasks of universities is not very clear when it comes to
commercialising knowledge (i.e. via spin-offs). It is not explicitly prohibited, but on the other
hand it is not encouraged in any way whatsoever. 
Overall, when the benefits and costs are set against each other, the balance is positive for
most of the Dutch research institutions (72%). 
Overall spin-off support activities are considered fairly positive by the spin-off entrepreneurs.
They give a mark of 6.5 for the support they received from the Dutch institutions. The most
important support activities mentioned by spin-off entrepreneurs are the use of research
facilities at the research institutions and the received technical and managerial advice.
Nevertheless, there are also sounds to be heard, even from the research institutes themselves,
that spin-off support could be better. Important pointers for improvement are the barriers and
Table 3.3 Reasons for spin-off stimulation by universities (%)
Strengthening of the image of the university  86 71
Fulfilment of the mission of commitment to society  71 71
Improving the career prospects of employees 64 86
Reinforcement of relations with business community 64 71
Enlargement of university budget 64 71
Attracting new students 57 43
Job creation  50 29
Fulfilling regional function 50 71
Stimulate market orientation of the institute 43 86
Strengthening fundamental research 36 71
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bottlenecks that research institutions face when promoting spin-offs, namely: 
- Availability of limited financial resources to stimulate spin-offs; 
- A field of tension between the officially assigned task and the commercialisation of
knowledge;
- Limited support for stimulating spin-offs because of the absence of an entrepreneurial
culture;
- Insufficient availability of expertise within the knowledge institutions for supporting 
spin-offs;
- Insufficient physical space, facilities and manpower at knowledge institutions for stimulating
spin-offs.
As mentioned above, support activities such as the use of research facilities and technical
advice are seen as most important by the spin-off entrepreneurs. From this we can derive the
assumption that spin-offs operate in the field of technology and thus can be categorized as
technology-based start-ups. This assumption is supported by the literature, which is very much
emphasised towards technological spin-offs; there is hardly any literature to be found on non-
technological spin-offs. According to some authors spin-offs from research institutions are
technological by definition. Looking at the results of the benchmark study, the picture is as
follows:
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of spin-offs of Dutch research institutions based
on technology (n=29)
Source: International Benchmark TSI
As can be seen in figure 3.2 most spin-offs in the Netherlands can be categorized as
technology-based but some research institutions (14%) indicate that less than 40 percent of
their spin-offs is technology-based. It should be noticed, however, that the line between techno
versus non-techno is not easy to draw because of the characteristic development process that
most spin-off companies go through. It is not always true that the spin-off entrepreneur alwaysEntrepreneurship in the Netherlands 44
As can be seen in figure 3.3 spin-offs and ‘normal’ technology-based start-ups are roughly
seen confronted with the same problems and challenges. A remarkable difference however is
the fact that spin-offs experience more problems with obtaining patents and with determining
the final product and the way to commercialise it. This can be explained by the fact that,
generally speaking, there are two types of technology-based start-ups. The companies
starts his company with a ready-to-use technology, developed at the research institution. 
The literature in this perspective indicates that a lot of spin-offs practice consultancy to
generate the first cash flow by which the vision or idea of the technological product can be
developed in interaction with the market.
9 It is remarkable though that this phenomenon
appears to be more important in the Netherlands compared to benchmark countries.
So, when we conclude that most (if not all) spin-offs are a sub-category of technology-based
start-ups, there is no reason for specific policy attention to spin-off companies in addition to
the ‘normal’ technology-based start-up policy. After all, spin-offs companies should face the
same problems and challenges as ‘normal’ technology-based start-ups do. In figure 3.3 this
hypothesis is tested by means of data from a survey among technology-based start-ups,
recently commisioned on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Finding administrative,
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Figure 3.3 Barriers experienced by spin-offs and ‘normal’ 
technology-based start-ups
Source: McKinsey/EZ, Technology-based start-up survey 2003.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 45
orientated towards more ‘in-house’ research. Examples of this type of techno start-ups can be
found in the life sciences. At the other end of the spectrum are the more application-oriented
companies. Many of the ICT-companies set up in the 1990s were examples of more application-
oriented businesses. A lot of these companies applied new technology without always having
developed the technology themselves. Most academic spin-offs belong to the first category,
after all they stem from fundamental research and the company is founded to further develop
an invention into an actual product or service. As a consequence the time to market for spin-
offs is, on average, longer than other technology-based start-ups. The closer the product is to
the market, the easier it is to determine the final product and the way to earn money with it.
Furthermore, when the distance to the market is short, like in the ICT-sector, it is more
important to have the technical lead on competitors than to have Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR). Technological developments in such a sector will follow each other very rapidly which
means that the IPR gets outdated very quickly. 
Since there is hardly any difference in the barriers for spin-offs and technology-based start-ups
we join other authors by seeing spin-offs as a subset of technology-based start-ups. 
3.6 Policy mix
Although policy makers throughout the industrial countries become more and more interested
in fostering the creation of spin-offs, in most countries there is no specific spin-off legislation.
Mostly spin-off policy forms part of the innovation, fiscal or start-up policy. The reason for this
growing interest and, in some cases, public support on spin-offs differs between countries. The
two main arguments for spin-off policies are
10: 
- Increase the return on investments in public research;
- Increase the number of technology-based start-ups (to stimulate innovation).
According to the first argument spin-off policy can be seen as a particular policy to address
industry-science-relationships and according to the second argument it can be seen as a
specific policy to foster technology-based start-ups. In several EU-countries the first argument
seems to be the most important. 
In the Netherlands policy on spin-off creation used to have low priority, but since start-ups and
especially technology-based start-ups are high on the agenda, there is now a growing
importance for spin-offs. Spin-off policy is part of our innovation policy and more specific, part
of our policy on technology-based start-ups. Like the European Commission, spin-off policy in
the Netherlands is seen in a broader perspective: “It is a multi-facet policy area and it calls for
an integrated approach. It is therefore necessary to (…) find a balanced mix in a portfolio of
interrelated policy tools. ”
11
This “portfolio of policy tools” in the Netherlands till now focuses on the following elements:
- Awareness creation;
- Availability of infrastructure (i.e. capital, machinery etc.).
Several technology-based start-up programmes on one or both of these elements were
launched throughout the years. For example:
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offer advice, networks, financing and housing for ICT start-ups;
• BioPartner; the BioPartner scheme is similar to the Twinning scheme although it is
focused on biotech start-ups. The scheme also offers housing, facilities, first-stage financing,
advice and networks;
• Dreamstart; a first-stop-shop offering brokerage toward all support services for techno
start-ups;
• Technostarter funds; these funds were set-up (1996) to improve first stage financing for
techno start-ups. There are three regional funds, which are offering first stage financing;
the purpose of the scheme is to improve the focus of research institutions on the transfer of
knowledge by encouraging them to offer a high level of infrastructure and support to
technology based start-ups. 
• WBSO; which is a tax incentive scheme that encourages R&D in private companies by
means of a wage cost reduction for researchers.
These initiatives have been developed alongside each other over the years and complement
each other, but there is also a certain overlap. To minimise this overlap and to strengthen our
policy on technology-based start-ups, the Ministry of Economic Affairs started an operation at
the end of 2002 to streamline the support framework. The outcome of this operation will be an
integral policy on technology-based start-ups. A so-called zero base method is used. This
means that we started from scratch: what if there wasn’t any policy on techno start-ups at all?
In that case, what should we do first?
To answer these questions the challenges and problem areas concerning technology-based
start-ups were charted. Technology-based start-ups have to deal, just like ‘normal’ start-ups
with problems like a considerable administrative burden, stigma on failure etc. Beside these
Figure 3.4 Barriers for technology-based start-ups
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problems, techno start-ups also face some specific challenges (IP-related challenges for
example) and experience some normal challenges as a bigger obstacle than ‘normal’ start-ups.
With figure 3.3 we already gave some insights in the challenges and obstacles technology-
based start-ups are confronted with. Figure 3.4 gives an synthesis of the problem areas.
Three major problem areas are identified: 
Lack of entrepreneurial skills 
These skills refer to the ability to attract new customers, writing a business plan to interest
informal investors or venture capitalists, product development etc. The founders of many
technology-based start-ups have a technical or scientific background. It is precisely within
these fields that only limited attention is given to entrepreneurship, with the result that
entrepreneurial skills are not or hardly developed at all, so that especially the start-up phase is
very difficult. In addition, many technology-based start-ups place more importance on
technology than marketing. While it is precisely marketing that is especially important in the
beginning in order to build up a network and a client base. 
Entrepreneurial culture
The Dutch culture is not very favourable towards starting your own business, especially not
compared to other western countries. If a society is risk-averse this may result in a lower
number of start-ups. Most likely this effect is even bigger for the more risky forms of
entrepreneurship such as new technology-based firms. As far as entrepreneurship amongst
researchers is concerned, there seems to be considerable room for improvement on this point,
especially in the risk-averse culture and policy of knowledge institutes. Furthermore, the Dutch
educational system does not encourage students to become self-employed. 
Risk capital (specific early stage money)
Attracting risk-capital often appears to be difficult for an technology-based start-ups (especially
since the downturn of the ICT-markets). Core of this problem is the so-called information
asymmetry problem. Technology-based start-ups have no ‘track record’ to fall back on, and
furthermore they have very uncertain market prospects with high risks.
12 Although the Dutch
market for venture capital is well developed, very little is invested in the preparation/seed
stage, the stage before the actual launch of the company. While for various types of
technology-based start-ups (e.g. in life sciences) it is precisely at this stage that there is a great
need for capital. The difference between, for example, the Netherlands and US is that providers
of venture capital in the US seem to be more focused on innovative start-ups. Another aspect
in this connection is the short-term orientation of many venture capital providers.
13
Should the government play a role in these fields? Is there a rational for government
interference? In general, there is a role for the government if there is a form of failure
underneath. This may be a market failure, like information asymmetry, or a system failure like
lack of attention to entrepreneurship in the educational system. Is this the case in the above
mentioned areas? Although hard to proof, the answer is yes:Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 48
Entrepreneurial skills
The market for easily accessible coaching/advice for technology-based start-ups is not
transparent for the individual techno start-up.
14 As a result, the techno start-up faces high
seeking costs (transaction costs) because he cannot find his way in this labyrinth of support
schemes and support organisations. The starter does not have full information. Furthermore,
technology-based start-ups do not have a fully developed network and no entrance to potential
clients with whom they can adapt the idea or product to the market circumstances. Besides
these forms of market failures there also seem to be system failures in this matter: in the
educational system there is hardly any attention in the curricula for entrepreneurial skills, so
the through flow from the educational system to entrepreneurship is hampered and those who
start are not well prepared. 
Entrepreneurial culture
The system failure mentioned above (lack of attention to entrepreneurial skills) also holds
when it comes to the entrepreneurial culture. Furthermore, there is a system failure when it
comes to commercialising public funded research; the legal definition of the tasks of
universities in the Netherlands is not very clear about commercialising knowledge and as a
consequence there is no incentive doing so. Changing the culture and creating a competitive
culture in which entrepreneurship can flourish is however a difficult goal to reach and cannot
be done by the market sector. 
Risk capital (specific early stage money)
The technology-based start-up has a leading edge in technical knowledge compared to the
(potential) investor. As a result the investor is confronted with relatively high screening costs
and high risks, especially because the techno start-up has no ‘track record’ to fall back on and
has uncertain market prospects with high risks. As a result the investor is inclined to invest in
less risky projects. The longer the time to market of a product, the bigger this information
asymmetry is. Furthermore the return on investment for the investor can be lower than the
return of the product for the society as a whole. This is especially true for radical new products.
The investor will only take his individual return on investment into account when making the
investment decision. 
Following the above, government interference seems to be justified. Focal point of this
interference should be diminishing the problems faced by technology-based start-ups without
disturbing market forces. What does the reverification of the Dutch technology-based start-up
policy look like?
The analyses of the streamlining operation pointed out that the following elements should
play a role in technology-based start-up policies: 
- Shift the focus away from stimulating the quantity of technology-based start-ups to the
fostering of the quality of technology-based start-ups. Till now the policy goal was aimed 
at the quantity aspect: increase in the number of 50% of techno start-ups to be reached in Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 49
4 years. The ultimate policy goal now is the creation of high added value and employment
by techno start-ups.
- Stimulation of an entrepreneurial culture via the education system to enlarge the source
from which future technology-based start-ups arise.
- Consider the utilisation of research via technology-based start-ups when programming
scientific research.
- Foster entrepreneurship at research institutions so that these institutions become more
entrepreneurial in research utilisation and motivate their employees to set up a spin-off
company.
- Make use of incubators which have been developed around research institutions over the
past years to stimulate the number and quality of technology-based start-ups. Make sure
that these incubators are also available for technology-based start-ups from outside the
research institute. The focal point of the incubator should be the network and coaching
function instead of offering housing.
- Improve the accessibility of risk capital in the early stage of (potential) technology-based 
start-ups.
- Streamline the current initiatives on technology-based start-ups to improve the transparency
of support facilities.
- Help research institutions to overcome IPR- and IPR transfer-related problems. 
Mixing these elements into a policy concept, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has worked out
a vision on technology-based start-up policy for the near future. This policy however is still
‘under construction’, which means that the ministry is gathering third party comments to
finetune the foreseen policy. Regional incubators are the spill in this vision when it comes to
coaching. Futhermore they provide an integral approach of the challenges technology-based
start-ups are confronted with. After all, incubators offer much more than just coaching; often
they function as a sort of screening mechanism for business angles or venture capitalists, they
offer a relevant network to the start-ups, et cetera. Together with a national platform, which
serves as a one-stop-shop for techno start-ups, they form the portal of the support structure for
the individual techno start-up. This so-called ‘TechnoPartner’ structure is the result of the
streamlining of the current initiatives, like the above mentioned BioPartner - scheme,
Dreamstart etc. With this structure, the numerous instruments and schemes are brought back
to one initiative consisting of the following pillars: 
1 TechnoPartner Financing, which will improve access to risk-capital in the pre-seed and the
seed phase. This can be done, for example, by setting up a fund providing pre-seed loans to
(potential) technology-based start-ups for the costs of drafting business plans (including
developing a prototype etc.). In the seed phase one can think of a co-investment fund or a
financial guarantee for private investments to reduce the risk for the investor; 
2 TechnoPartner Business Plan Contest, to promote entrepreneurship among researchers and
potential techno start-ups.
3 TechnoPartner Platform, which has the task to inform (potential) techno start-ups how to
start their business, help research institutions to become more entrepreneurial, organise and
maintain an incubator network, to monitor developments in various relevant sectors, to
stimulate awareness by organizing seminars and conferences etc. etc. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 50
The TechnoPartner structure has ideally a generic character, it is not biased to a specific sector.
Nevertheless, special attention to some sectors can be paid if necessary. The life science sector
is an example of such a sector; it differs from other sectors because of the long time to market
and relative high investments in the seed phase. 
Because of the important role incubators play in the support structure the above mentioned
Technostart-up Infrastructure Scheme will be used (after adjustment) to improve the quality of
(existing) incubators by providing subsidies to research institutions to: a) set up a scouting
mechanism to trace potential spin-off projects, b) realise a relevant network in the region of
the incubator, c) realise a coaching structure in and around the incubator and d) provide
technology-based start-ups access to specific equipment and facilities. Research institutions, in
cooperation with vested companies and/or other private parties, can apply for subsidy. One of
the conditions for having a subsidy granted will be that full attention is given to
entrepreneurship in the curriculum. 
Another foreseen policy action aimed at the strengthening of an entrepreneurial spirit at
research institutions is the formation of a patent subsidy for universities to meet the high costs
universities face when applying for (and maintaining of) patents. Such a scheme can boost
patent applications of public universities. Financing of patents is coupled with specific claims
for the use of the patent, for example a smooth transfer of the patent to spin-off companies. 
3.7 Conclusions
As we made clear in the first section of this chapter there is great potential at the Dutch
research institutions for creating numerous new spin-off companies. There is already a
reasonably large degree of commitment in the research community for stimulating spin-off
companies. However, spin-off creation is not a widely used tool out of the tool box, which is
available for solving the hampering knowledge transfer. A joint approach of research
institutions together with the national government and with the business community will lead
to a further increase in the quality and quantity of spin-offs from Dutch research institutions.
Intensification of this effort is also important in an international context because the
Netherlands is definitely not a frontrunner when it comes to promoting the commercialisation
of knowledge through spin-offs. A joint intensification of spin-off policy is likely to lead in the
short term to a substantial strengthening of the Dutch economy on the one hand and
improvement of the competitive position of the Dutch research institutions on the other.
Therefore, it is to be hoped that the efforts do not fall by the wayside on the slippery road
between the ivory tower of academic freedom and the golden calf of freedom of
entrepreneurship
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4 Knowledge transfer, entrepreneurship and 
economic growth: some reflections 
and implications for policy
By Alan Hughes, University of Cambridge, UK 
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I wish to provide some reflections on knowledge transfer concerned with
‘innovative entrepreneurship’. This is potentially a very broad canvas, especially since the
terms ‘innovative start up’ and ‘innovative entrepreneurship’ are themselves imprecisely
defined. There is certainly a large and rapidly growing literature on new knowledge based
firms and their relationship with the science base. That literature and the lessons that may be
drawn for policy have been the subject of several overviews at an international level (see e.g.
OECD (2002)) and in some detail in the case of the Netherlands, not least in the current and
several previous volumes in this series. There is also an expanding recent literature relating to
the institutional design and management of incubators and spin-off
1 programs, and their
incidence and impact in Europe and the OECD generally
2. It is therefore neither useful nor
possible to attempt a comprehensive review of that kind here, nor to provide a detailed
assessment of Dutch policy in this area. Instead, I will be deliberately selective. I will reflect on
three issues which in my view have important implications both for policy towards university
related new technology based firms, and for what growth outcomes may generally be
anticipated from the kind of approach discussed in the policy chapters by Marcel Kreijen and
Astrid van der Laag (this volume) and Arnoud Muizer (this volume). 
The first of these three issues is the interpretation to be placed on the relative role and
significance of new firms and high technology sectors in recent US growth and productivity
performance, and its policy implications. The second is the lesson to be drawn for the relative
importance of new and existing firms in productivity performance in general and across
different technology based sectors in the growth experience of the OECD economies. My
discussion draws on a number of recent studies based on decompositions of macroeconomic
data for the USA and the OECD. These have in my view, important implications for the scale
and direction of effects we can expect from technology transfer policies targeted at new and
small businesses in technology based sectors. The third issue is the policy implications that
may be drawn for university based commercialization and spin-out policy drawing on the
experience of the USA. This bears in particular upon the issues of attitudinal and cultural
constraints on science industry relations in the Netherlands which are emphasized in the
assessments (in this volume) by Marcel Kreijen and Astrid van der Laag and by Arnoud Muizer.
It also bears on the incentive and institutional problems that Muizer highlights, and which arise
in attempting to devise policies to strengthen the links between industry and the science base. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 54
4.2 Technology transfer, entrepreneurship and economic growth
The strength and nature of the link between the growth of economic welfare and the
development and exploitation of scientific and technological understanding has become a
central theme in macroeconomic, industrial and technology policy discussions. At the same
time there has been an increasing emphasis on the role which new technology based firms
and entrepreneurship play in the technology transfer process (OECD (2001a) (2002)). These
developments are closely related to the recent objective set at the European Council in Lisbon
in March 2000 of the EU becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth, more and better jobs, and greater social
cohesion. It is also reflected in policy analyses for the UK, the USA, and the OECD in general. 
In the particular case of the Netherlands the emphasis upon technology transfer related
activities has been reinforced, against this general background, by a series of evidence based
assessments of trends in entrepreneurial and innovation indicators and policies. This evidence
is well set out in the previous chapters in this report and in contributions to previous volumes
in this series (see e.g. Waasdorp (2002) (Stevenson (2002)). 
These analyses reveal a holistic
3 approach to entrepreneurship and innovation policy in the
Netherlands. It encompasses both policies aimed at individuals and attitudes, as well as
policies aimed at companies and organisations in the public and private sectors. They also
reveal that many of the conditions which are thought to be necessary for high levels of
innovative entrepreneurship based on technology transfer are now in place. Furthermore, on
many relevant dimensions the Dutch economy benchmarks well against other EU economies.
‘The nation that fosters an infrastructure of linkages among and between firms,
universities and government gains competitive advantage through quicker information
diffusion and product deployment.’ 
(US Council on Competitiveness (1998)
‘In an increasingly knowledge-driven global economy invention and innovation are
critical to Britain’s long term competitiveness. This requires a virtuous circle of
innovation: from the very best in science, engineering, and technology in universities and
science labs to the successful exploitation of new ideas, new science, and new
technologies by businesses.’
(DTI, H.M. Treasury, DFES, (2002))
‘Young technology based firms play a key role in linking science to markets.
Governments rightly attach priority to encouraging spin-offs from public research to
stimulate innovation.’
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This includes, in particular, relatively high levels of public R&D expenditure, of patenting, and
of scientific output, relatively positive nascent entrepreneurs’ attitude to failure, as well as
relatively high levels of equity and venture capital, and of innovative output. The Netherlands,
moreover, scores well in terms of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey and
interview-based assessments of the business climate for entrepreneurship. The same source
suggests that entrepreneurial activity has held up relatively well in the Netherlands in the face
of the global macroeconomic slowdown
4. 
Some evidence, however, points to concerns about technology transfer issues. Thus there is
some evidence that in terms of human capital provision, the proportion of new science and
engineering graduates per 1000 of the population is half that of the EU average and
employment in high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing and high-tech services is below
average, and about average, respectively compared to the EU (EU 2001). Lack of skilled labour
is also identified in recent surveys as the major constraint for SMEs forcing them to rely on
internal training Bosma (this volume). Lack of marketing and management skills are also
emphasised as spin-off constraints in recent research (Kreijen and van der Laag (this volume).
There is also some evidence that new start ups in high growth sectors are relatively low by
international standards (EIM (2001)). 
The GEM survey and interview programme produces some further recent results bearing on
technology transfer. The GEM surveys for 2002 show that on average 3.5% of GEM key
informants across their global sample of countries perceive knowledge transfer to be a
weakness in the promotion of innovative activity amongst new and start-up firms, whereas
15% of key informants in the Netherlands do (Muizer (this volume) p.6). Similar evidence also
raises concerns about equal access to, and the cost of, and value of subsidies for technology
transfer from public research centres and universities to new and growing firms in the
Netherlands. Some concern is also expressed about the capacity to support world class
technology in at least one area. This evidence is primarily based upon attitudinal surveys of
expert practitioners carried out as part of the GEM programme for 2001. It is worth noting that
the differences with respect to the average scores on these issues for the EU countries are very
small. The concern is more based on the scores given for this aspect of Dutch policy relative to
other Dutch policy scores. (See e.g. Bosma, Stigter and Wennekers (2002) esp. Table 7 p. 42.).
Moreover other surveys paint a somewhat different picture. Thus the findings of the EU
innovation barometer for 2001 show the Netherlands with one of the highest proportions of
firms reporting satisfaction with access to advanced technologies. It also shows Dutch firms as
third most likely to collaborate with universities and to report the highest propensity to use
intellectual property licensing as a means of accessing advanced technology (EU (2002)). Since
the barometer survey excludes firms with less than 20 employees this suggests that such
difficulties as have been identified may be size specific rather than general across the SME
spectrum. 
Finally in this volume Marcel Kreijen and Astrid van der Laag present recent benchmarking
evidence on university spin-offs which confirms the relatively low numbers of such activity
across all countries and shows a small gap (in terms of average numbers of spin-offs per
university year) between the Netherlands (6.4) and the international benchmark group (7.1).
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from shortages of start-up capital, and lack of physical space and of internal expertise to
support spin-offs. They also stress the need for management and marketing competence in
spin-off development. Finally they emphasise the absence of an ‘entrepreneurial culture’ and
tensions between the commercialisation of knowledge and ‘the officially assigned task’ of
universities. This may lead to perceived conflicts of interest as emphasised in his chapter in
this volume by Arnoud Muizer. He locates the root of those difficulties which do arise in ‘… an
attitudinal problem of the ones who possess the knowledge’, and argues that ‘A conflict of
interests seems to be the main cause for the poor interaction between public knowledge
institutions and companies’ and that this relates to a number of significant underlying causes.
The first of these is identified as a conflict between the interest of scientists in autonomy in
their pursuit of long term fundamental, or basic curiosity driven research and the pursuit of
directed short term demand driven research for use in industry. Second, a tension is identified
between the desire to publish by scientists and the need for commercial exploitation based on
exclusivity. Finally, it is argued that scientists place too much reliance on contacts with large as
opposed to small firms in forging relationships, and as a result there is a complementary lack
of emphasis upon spin-offs and start-ups. 
Several policy approaches for the Netherlands are suggested in this volume to resolve these
problems. Thus Kreijen and van der Laag outline a new streamlined TechnoPartner strategy
designed to raise the quality rather than the quantity of spin- offs, to use the education system
to change culture, and to introduce the utilisation of research as a criteria when programming
scientific research. Specifically policies are discussed based on seed corn funding for spin-off
business plan writing and prototyping; state funded guarantees for seed-phase informal and
formal venture capital spin-off investment; business plan competitions and advice for
institutions and individuals on start up activities. This will be combined with a patent fund to
subsidise university patent management, and a programme to strengthen the incubator
network in which access to subsidy is linked to curriculum development. Regional incubators
will be the principal instrument for delivering the coaching and networking structures around
institutions. They anticipate that this ‘is likely to lead in the short-term to a substantial
strengthening of the Dutch economy on the one hand and improvement of the competitive
position of the Dutch research institutions on the other’. The way in which research
programming will be affected by considerations of usefulness is not spelled out but must be
an important issue given the claimed tensions between the needs of commerce and scientists.
Indeed in Muizer’s view attitudes are the central problem. ‘The real solution therefore lies in
the realisation of a change of attitudes’ (Muizer (this volume)). 
I will return to the issue of the likely short-term impact of spin-off policies generally, and the
nature of attitudinal conflicts and their resolution after discussing in turn the characteristics of
recent US economic growth, the relative role of start-ups exit and entry in productivity growth
and the nature of university industry relationships in the USA. 
In analysing university/industry links in the USA I will emphasise that a linear view of
knowledge transfer, in which there is an essentially sequential process running from basic
research through development to commercialization, is fundamentally misleading. It leads too
easily to a sense of a zero sum game in which to favour basic science is to prejudice
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based on new business formation at the expense of other critical interactions with existing
firms, through publications, shared laboratory space, consultancy, and most fundamentally the
education and training of high quality graduates and doctoral students. As Kreijen and van der
Laag note in their chapter in this volume spin-offs need to be seen in perspective, as one
aspect of a multi-faceted integrated approach.
4.3 High technology, productivity and GDP growth:
Arkansas v. Silicon Valley
European policy concerns with the link between the science base, technology transfer, and
entrepreneurship developments have been given particular impetus by the transformation of
the relative growth and productivity performance of the US economy compared to the EU and
OECD countries in the last decades of the 20th century. Particular emphasis has been placed
here on the role attributed to technology based sectors in that transformation
5.
A few salient facts may illustrate the kind of data upon which these emphases are based.
Between 1990 and 2000 the US economy grew at an annual average rate of 3.2%, compared
with 2.0% for the EU 15 and 2.5% for the OECD 24 (OECD 2003). This was based upon faster
productivity growth which in contrast to the EU was combined with increased employment. 
By the turn of the last century high tech value added as a proportion of manufacturing was
25.8% in the USA compared with an EU mean of 8.2% and the highest EU proportion of
around 20% for Ireland (EU 2001).
It is worth looking at this performance more closely however. A number of studies have
revealed that the role of technology using sectors, and innovation in organisational and
management techniques bear as close attention as the performance of the high technology
generating sectors. A recent analysis by Robert Solow is instructive in this respect
(www.cmi.cam.ac.uk/ncn/summit-2001-videos/solow/text.html). Solow points out that US
growth in the nineteen nineties was dominated by events from 1995. Whereas real GDP growth
per person hour was 2.9% from 1947-1972, and 1.4 % from 1972-1995, it was 2.5% from 
1995-2000
6. Thus the recent US performance in this respect is essentially a return to very long
run trends. Above trend performance is focussed on a very short period (see also more
generally on this point OECD (2003)). This should lead to some caution in attributing superior
US performance in the second half of the nineties to specific cultural factors which might be
expected to operate over longer periods of time such as a culture of enterprise, or attitudes to
failure, or of small firm employment creation (which clearly predates this macroeconomic
performance shift). It is also instructive to look more closely at the sectoral patterns behind the
shift in growth performance to examine the role of technology based sectors in the 1995-2000
resurgence.
The contribution which a sector makes in an accounting sense to overall productivity and
output growth depends on its productivity increase and its employment size. The significance
of a sector in employment terms affects the weight which its performance has in affecting
overall economy performance. Solow disaggregates US real productivity growth 1995-2000
between 59 sectors and shows that 6 of the 59 account for all of the acceleration in
productivity growth. The net contribution of the other 56 was zero. The top three wereEntrepreneurship in the Netherlands 58
wholesaling, retailing, and security and commodity broking. The next three were electronic and
electric equipment (semi-conductors) industrial machinery and equipment (computers) and
telecoms. These latter three high- tech producing sectors contributed one third of the impact of
the top three ‘low tech sectors’. From this perspective it is clear that the superior performance
was not accounted for by developments in the high technology producing sectors per se. 
High tech sectors to be sure had high levels of productivity growth and this accelerated in the
late nineties but their relative size meant they played a smaller role in macro performance than
is often claimed (OECD (2003)). From a knowledge transfer policy perspective this means that
attention should be paid to the processes affecting productivity change in technology using as
well as technology producing sectors.
It is worthwhile, therefore, to look at the productivity dynamic which occurred in the lead
sectors of wholesaling and retailing. In wholesaling warehouse centralization and automation
based on ‘old’ IT, and scale gains and functional reorganisation were exploited in the face of
competitive pressures from retailers. This was the so-called ‘Wal-Mart effect’. Based on an
Arkansas family start-up Wal-Mart’s Market Share in retailing in the US in 1987 was 9%, with 
a productivity advantage of 40% over its rivals. By the mid-nineties its share was 40%. 
From 1995-1999 competitors raised productivity by 28% but Wal-Mart’s productivity advantage
rose to 48% (M.Schrage Technology Review March 2002 p.21). Its retailing productivity growth
was based on scale effects in warehousing, electronic data interchange, bar code scanning.
Productivity in the sector as a whole was driven by imitation, adaptation and organizational
innovation by rivals.
From this perspective Arkansas made a greater contribution to productivity growth than
Silicon Valley, and organizational and management innovation, as much as technological
change, drove the productivity dynamic. However, this is not really the most important point.
The key lesson to be drawn is more general. Wholesaling retailing and financial trading are all
sectors which use information technology developments. ITC users are more significant than
producers in ‘accounting’ for productivity growth but they depend upon the former for their
innovative inputs. The effective use of those inputs requires organizational innovation and
embodiment of ICT innovations in user sectors. The demand for, and capacity to absorb, the
output of high-tech producing sectors by technology users are crucial drivers of overall recent
US performance, and the latter sectors have supplied the products with high and rising
efficiency. Thus investment in ICT goods and software is estimated to have accounted for 0.9
percentage points of US GDP growth 1995-2000 (OECD (2003) p. 46). The ability to absorb and
benefit from this investment depended upon the technical competence of management in
recognising and implementing appropriate technologies. A supply push technology transfer
policy (focussing on output and business formation in high tech sectors) which neglects the
importance of the management and technical competence of the firms on the demand side
(domestic users) will be missing an important lesson. This lesson is that investment in physical
and software capital and investment in human capital and managerial and technical skills are
required. It points therefore to a broader educational, curriculum and training side of
technology transfer policy for innovative start ups, and for technology users.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 59
4.4 Entrepreneurship, new firms and economic growth:
new boys on the block versus golden oldies.
In contrast to the policy emphasis placed upon entrepreneurship it is a striking feature of the
macro-economic literature on the determinants of differences in economic growth that it very
rarely mentions entrepreneurship per se. It is also a pervasive problem of the literature on the
determinants of economic growth that there are so many potential explanatory variables, and
so many missing data problems, that systematic analysis comparing alternative explanations is
difficult to achieve. Thus Freeman (2001) points out that in one influential review 87 different
explanatory variables are reported for testing on cross section samples of long term growth
rates for around 20 OECD countries. In the case of adding entrepreneurship as yet another
variable one key problem is how to define and measure it. Another is dealing with problems 
of causation. Are time series and cross section fluctuations in small business formation and
growth a cause, or a consequence, of variations in economic growth over time, or across
countries? Direct measures of entrepreneurial attitudes and activity have recently been
developed as part of the GEM surveys. Development of better longitudinal datasets, of more
direct measures of different entrepreneurial activity of this kind, may assist in econometric
analysis of impacts on growth. Preliminary results along these lines reported in GEM (2002),
however, reveal few systematic connections between entrepreneurial activity, entrepreneurial
potential, or supporting framework conditions and growth (see esp. GEM (2002) p. 23 ff.). 
The GEM analyses are of necessity restricted to short periods and the authors acknowledge that
more work needs to be done. A number of other studies have sought to link proxies for entre-
preneurship, such as small business shares, or self employment, to cross national variations in
growth or unemployment rates and report positive links or links which imply adverse growth
consequences if these proxies depart from estimated equilibrium levels (see e.g. Caree et. al.
(2002), Audretsch and Thurik (2002))
7. It is also possible to draw some broad conclusions about
the significance of entrepreneurial entry for productivity growth using a recent programme of
comparative international research carried out by OECD (OECD (2003)). This decomposes
productivity growth over time for a country into effects due to new entry, exit, and the
performance of survivors, respectively. The analysis covers the largest OECD economies for the
periods 1987-92 and 1992-97.
Productivity growth in any period for a national population of firms can be decomposed into:
productivity growth within firms that survive; reallocation of output between high and low
productivity firms that survive; the impact of new entry; and the impact of exit. The research
shows that these components vary across countries and industries but that the dominant
component in labour productivity growth in manufacturing
8 is that which is driven by
survivors, i.e. ‘golden oldies’ with high within firm productivity growth. Thus the ‘within firm’
shares ranged between 55% and 95% in the eighties/nineties with France, Germany and the
USA showing the highest shares for this component . Exit and entry are highly correlated
across industries within countries, and the net effect of this ‘churning’ accounts for 20%-40% of
labour productivity growth. The rate of churning is similar across the USA and the European
countries. The net effect of churning is, however, dominated by the exit of low labour
productivity firms rather than by new entry. Reallocation of activity amongst existing firms is
usually less important than the other three forces.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 60
New entrants, the ‘new kids on the block’, come and go with much less impact on productivity
than improvements in ‘golden oldies’. On average in the OECD sample about 20% of firms in
any year are new but only 40-50% survives for 7 years. Moreover, entry frequently has a
negative direct effect. The negative effect of entry arises essentially from the low productivity
performance of new firms compared with incumbents. A positive new entry impact is unusual
with Netherlands and Italy notable in this respect. Most strikingly the new entry component for
the United States is large and negative, and the ‘new kids on the block’ are smaller relative to
the mean size of incumbents. Moreover their survival rates appear to be lower. On the other
hand those that survive grow faster in the USA than in Europe. 
A number of other results are worth noting. First, new entry effects are bigger when
productivity is measured over longer time periods, consistent with positive learning and scale
effects as the new kids who stick around expand. Second, entry effects are bigger in information
and communication technology sectors, in both manufacturing and services, where rapid
technical change and relatively low entry barriers allow for a more dynamic entry regime
9. 
This analysis has a couple of important implications for knowledge transfer policy linked to
entrepreneurship. The first of these is that it is not entry per se but the subsequent survival
and competitive expansion of new entrants that is important. A focus on barriers to post-entry
growth is therefore as important as or more important than the generation of more new
entrants, as such, in designing technology transfer and innovative start up policy. Identifying
and overcoming barriers to growth in productivity in incumbents is also important and will
carry greater weight in industry productivity growth, not least because of their greater share of
activity. Bridging gaps between incumbent firms, large and small, and the science base (i.e. the
stock) yields potentially wider gains than focussing only on building new bridges through start-
ups (i.e. the flow).The second broad lesson is that prospects for innovative new entry may be
sector/technology specific and be stronger the longer the period they have to work themselves
out. It follows that some sector differentiation in policy is required. New entry plays a more
positive role in high tech sectors and over longer periods. Superior performance through
innovative new entry requires patience and is a long game. Moreover, in so far as new firm
entry is connected with innovation in new products and processes it is important to emphasise
that it is a highly skewed world. In the highly regarded UK government SMART (Small Firms
Award for Research and Technology) scheme 80% of sales generated by award winners were
produced by the top 20% of award holders. Equally, of the 20968 active IPR licenses held by
US universities which yielded $1.2billion of gross licensing revenues in fiscal year 2000 only
125 or 0.6% of the total generated more than $1 million each (AUTM (2002)).
There is, of course a substantial literature on barriers to innovation in small and medium sized
firms which can shed some light on why success on average may be hindered, and on the
relative role of access to the science base. It is important in interpreting it to note how constraints
may be contingent upon macroeconomic conditions. Thus, for instance, perceptions of barriers
in relation to access to finance, skilled labour, or export markets are sensitive to monetary
policy, labour market conditions, and exchange rate movements. This is less likely to be a
problem with the less contingent case of access to the science base. It is also important to note
that whether access to technology is identified as a barrier may depend upon how options in
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have, however, asked directly about this issue and thus provide the opportunity to place some
perspective on it in the EU.
The first thing to note is that these surveys show that universities and public research
institutes rank well below customers and suppliers as direct sources of new technological
knowledge for innovation in innovating firms especially at the lower end of the size spectrum
(Cosh and Hughes (2001) EU (2002)). The second point to note is that access to new technology
per se ranks systematically lower than other constraints on innovation. Thus the EU wide
results from the 2
nd Harmonised EU Community Innovation Survey reported that SMEs
experiencing constraints were more likely than large innovative enterprises to cite high
innovation costs, difficulties of access to finance and the cost of compliance with regulation as
the principal factors holding back innovation projects. Moreover, over 2/3 of EU SMEs cited
skill shortages as an innovation problem (Cosh and Hughes (2001))
10. In the EU innovation
barometer survey firms in all countries except the Netherlands cited human resources as the
main unsatisfied need for innovation (EU (2002). Similar patterns emerge from the regular
panel survey of the UK SME sector carried out by my colleagues at the Centre for Business
Research (CBR) in Cambridge covering the period 1991 to 2002. In the UK case hi-tech firms
and innovators were generally more likely than conventional and non-innovating firms to feel
constrained by a lack of management, marketing, and sales skills. The effect was especially
noticeable in high-tech and innovative service firms (Cosh and Hughes (1996) (1998) (2000)).
This strongly suggests that a policy focus on technology transfer needs to be embedded in a
wider framework. That wider framework must address the capacity of firms which are
encouraged to engage in knowledge transfer to be properly able to absorb, implement and
exploit that knowledge and employ appropriately qualified staff. 
4.5 Industrializing knowledge, spin outs and attitudes at the 
university-industry interface: the USA and Pasteur’s Quadrant
The increasing role of public sector science in industrial development can be readily illustrated.
In the late 1990’s it has been estimated that over 75% of references to scientific publications in
US patent applications were to publicly funded science. Moreover the average number of US
scientific papers cited in US patent applications rose more than six -fold between 1985 and
1998. The rise was particularly striking in biochemistry, organic chemistry, and medical and
veterinary science (OECD (2002)). Finally, in 2000 over 450 companies based upon a university
licensed scientific discovery were formed in the USA, with over 80% of these founded in the
state/province of the academic institution which created the technology. (OECD (2002), AUTM
(2002)). 
The growth and productivity performance of the USA, the dynamism of its high – tech sectors,
and the translation of that into inputs for transforming the performance of the high-tech using
sectors has led to great interest in the links between the science base and industry in that
country. Perhaps most strikingly in the case of the UK a policy experiment is in progress in
which the government is funding a joint venture between the University of Cambridge and MIT
specifically designed to develop and transfer aspects of US practice in university-industry
collaboration into a UK context (http://www.cambridge-mit.org). It is worthwhile, therefore,
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addressing the attitudinal and incentive issues raised by Muizer (this volume) and the policy
implications which may be drawn
One of the most influential views of the nature of science-industry relationships in the U.S. in
the post second world war period was set out by Vannevar Bush. Bush (Director of the war
time Office of Scientific Research and Development) in his report to the U.S. president
proposed a strategy for US science-industry relations after the war which would both ensure
substantial government resourcing for basic science, and, at the same time, free basic science
from government direction (Bush (1960)). Bush’s view was that national competitiveness would
suffer if basic science was neglected because depending upon other countries for these
advances would slow down US industrial progress. The assumptions behind his proposals to
avoid this happening to the US have been succinctly summarised in Stokes (1999). In Bush’s
own words these were that ‘basic research is performed without thought of practical ends’ and
that ‘applied research invariably drives out pure’ if they are mixed. On the other hand ‘basic
research is the pacemaker of technological progress’. Leave basic science to pursue its own
agenda and, as Stokes puts it, it ‘will be a remote but powerful dynamo’ as applied research
and development will convert discoveries into useful applications (Stokes (1999) p. 3). 
The ‘technology transfer problem’ on this view becomes one of defining appropriate institutions
and incentive structures for stages along an essentially linear path from basic research through
applied research, and then through development and into production. Research is either basic
or applied and a move towards one type means a move away from the other. Equally an
emphasis in policy to emphasise use in funding strategies implies an interference with the
curiosity driven pursuit of fundamental understanding of the basic research scientist. The
potential conflicts of interest between the needs of research users and those involved in basic
research identified by Muizer can then be seen as the manifestation of this separation.
It has however been persuasively argued that this approach misunderstands the actual pattern
of research activities. In particular it has been argued that a substantial proportion of university
and publicly funded research has always combined both considerations of use and the pursuit
of fundamental understanding. As a result the dichotomous approach in the linear model is
misleading, both in terms of science practice and in terms of policy design. This view has been
captured in the quadrant diagram shown in Fig.1 due to Stokes (1999). Here a distinction is
drawn between research which is solely concerned with use, typified by the work of Edison,
research which is solely concerned with fundamental understanding typified by the work of
Bohr, and research which involves both, typified by Pasteur, which Stokes demonstrates has a
long and distinguished role in the research structure of the natural sciences
11. 
Seen from this perspective the problem for technology transfer policy can be perceived as
having three broad components. The first is how to encourage recognition of the importance of
Pasteur’s quadrant in scientific and policy discourse. The second is how to promote/support
activity in Pasteur’s Quadrant by enabling scientific recognition of society’s concerns with particular
areas of use as a stimulus for the pursuit of fundamental understanding in relevant areas. The
third is how to encourage communication and interaction between quadrant communities. On
this interpretation the success of the USA in industrializing knowledge is to be understood less
in terms of specific policy initiatives to transform basic into applied research but in the ability of
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This ability has, in turn, been the result of the decentralized, competitive and regional structure
of the system and its close coupling of research and graduate education. Moreover, the second
world-war and the cold-war led to a massive expansion in federally funded scientific research
in universities linking fundamental knowledge to potential use. These characteristics have led
to historically diverse streams of funding, including high levels of industry funding, and a
close relationship of universities with state and regional industrial research needs, most
notably linked to the general origins and mission of land grant universities. The integration of
graduate education with research has also led to the argument that the primary contribution of
US universities to technological innovation is the human capital it produces. (See Branscomb
et. al. (1999), Rosenberg and Nelson (1994), Feller (1999), Etzkowitz, (1999), Stokes (1999),
Tornatzky Waugaman and Gray (2002) and National Association of State Universities and Land
Grant Colleges (2002) for an overview of relevant evidence on these points). 
These longstanding tendencies have received added impetus in the last quarter of the 20
th
century from a series of policy initiatives concerned with raising competitiveness in the face of
international, and especially Japanese, competition. These have included relaxation of anti-
trust laws to enable research joint venture collaborations (e.g. the 1984 National Cooperative
Research Act), policies to promote research on generic technologies (e.g. the Advanced
Technology Program established via the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, which
by 2000 had 57% of its projects with university participation
12), increased National Science
Foundation funding for University Industry Research Centres, and the introduction of the Small
Business Innovation Research Program. The latter mandates federal agencies to allocate
around 4% of their spending to small innovative businesses and has had close connections
with many university related spin-outs. There has also been a series of court decisions
strengthening intellectual property rights and the passing of the Bayh-Dole Patent and
Trademarks Amendment Act 1980. The Bayh-Dole Act gave blanket permission for performers
of federally funded research, including universities, to file for patents and grant licenses,
including exclusive licenses, on the basis of them. Its purpose was to accelerate the
commercialization of publicly funded R&D (on these developments generally see e.g. Branscomb
et.al. (1999), Cohen et.al. (1998), Poyago et.al. (2003), Mowery et.al. (1999), Wessner (2001)).
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These developments were associated with a surge in university patenting and licensing
activity, which coincided with the development in biomedical and biotechnological sectors that
were naturally encouraging to closer scientific industry relationships
13. The ratio of university
based patents to university R&D spend doubled from 1975-1990, and the top 100 research
universities doubled their number of patents between 1979 and 1984, and again between 1984
and 1989. There was an explosion in the numbers of university licensing offices from 25 in
1980 to 200 in 1990 (Mowery et.al. (1999)). The number of US patent applications filed by
respondents to the annual surveys carried out by the Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM) rose from 2469 in 1991 to 9925 in 2000, and licenses and options executed
rose from 1278 to 4362 over the same period, accompanied by a rise in gross license income
from $186 million to $1263 million. The vast majority of the licenses yielding this income were
exclusive. Even so by 1999 total gross licensing income was only around 2.7% of the total R&D
expenditure by universities. 
In the context of arguments that European universities may attract substantial sums of further
research funding from this licensing income it is important to note these findings. This caution
is reinforced by recalling the skewness of the returns to spin-outs and licensing, and the low
likelihood of many universities making a major breakthrough from this type of funding (AUTM
(2000)). The associated costs of staffing and administering technology licensing and related
offices to the degree required mean that very small net income or ‘net losses’ can frequently
occur, and where substantial sums do arrive they are associated with one or two big hits
(Mowery and Sampat (2001) Trune and Gosling (1998)).
In the context of arguments emphasising the importance of licensing and spin-offs as a means
of transferring knowledge it is also important to note that patenting remains significantly less
important than other means of knowledge transfer. Thus in the view of leading scientists at
MIT patenting accounts for less than 10% of knowledge transferred and exchanged from their
labs and ranks well below graduate recruitment, consultancy and publication. This ordering of
importance is shared by industry and other universities (Cohen et.al. (1998), Agrawal and
Henderson (2002), Lester (2003)) and it underscores the importance of widespread personal
and corporate interactions in facilitating knowledge transfer. Nor are spin-offs the most
significant component of licensing activity. This is illustrated next by examining the relative
role of innovative start ups, existing small firms (with less than 500 employees), and existing
large firms in US university licensing and spin-out activity. In doing this it is important to note
that by statute licensors of inventions made with federal funding must show a preference for
small companies. 
It has been estimated that AUTM licensing activity was associated with 3376 new start ups
between 1980 and 2000, of which 2309 were still operational in the latter year
14. The number of
such start ups doubled between 1994 and 2000. In 2000 618 licenses were granted by
universities, hospitals and research institutes to start ups, 2002 to small firms and 1346 to
large firms. Thus 51% of licenses granted were to small companies, and only 15% were to
start-ups. Over 90% of the start-up licenses were exclusive, as were 42% of those granted to
small firms, compared to 37% for large firms (AUTM (2002). In 2000 around 56% of the 454
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Given the size of the US business population and the total number of start-ups (circa 500,000
per year), even in high-tech sectors, university start-ups are small in number. Moreover, start
ups are a minority within overall licensing activity. (This general finding is true for the OECD as
a whole (OECD (2001b)). However, the AUTM approach employs a conservative definition of a
university start-up and ignores start-ups by alumni, or former students who deploy their
human and intellectual capital in business start-ups not specifically linked to university
patents. It is also important to note that an emphasis on start-ups also ignores the role that
universities play more generally in terms of consultancy contracts, the provision of qualified
graduates and postgraduates as employees for existing businesses, and as progenitors of
businesses unconnected with university licensed activity (Branscomb et.al.(1999)).
It is, nevertheless, of interest to ask which features lead to success in spin-off generation at the
university level
15. In doing this it is important to recognise that indicators of success in this
area are not well defined. Numbers of spin-outs is insufficient because it neglects their initial
scale as well as subsequent growth and survival. Equally the skewness of outcomes means
that a portfolio approach to evaluation is necessary. Finally, even if relatively few spin-outs
grow significantly, they can play an important transfer role through specialist consultancy
(Keeble et.al. (2001), OECD (2001)). There is clearly room for much more careful work here,
nevertheless a number of interesting results have emerged. 
It appears that strong local formal venture capital markets and university based venture capital
funds are not closely linked to spin-off formation and performance whilst more early stage
informal venture capital may be more relevant. This may reflect in the first case the preference
of the formal market for later stage investments, and in the latter case the need to ensure that
the funds have clear and stable goals and adequately incentivized management (Di Grigorio
and Shane (2003), Lerner (1999)). A clearly articulated and well understood university policy on
licensing and IPR is also positively linked to spin-off generation. It also helps in the promotion
of common understanding of its role in university activity (Di Grigorio and Shane (2003),
Siegel et.al.(2001) and for the UK Lockett et.al. (2003)). The same is true of the extent to which
licensing is combined with well managed equity support in early stage development of the
spin-off which helps address cash flow, licensing patenting and agency costs (Hsu and
Bernstein (1997). Spin-off activity is higher the lower is the share of inventor royalties
compared to industry licensees, and the higher is total industry spend on university based
research (Di Grigorio and Shane (2003)). Above all intellectual eminence and star status matter,
and only big research universities can justify serious investments in spin-off support activity
(see e.g. for the OECD, OECD (2001) and for Japan, Zucker and Darby(1998)). Moreover, there
appears to be a clear negative link between university research intensity and eminence, and
the relative degree of involvement with local or regional development activity and smaller
firms (for the UK see for example HEFCE (2003)). Moreover the contribution which spin-offs
and industry university interaction can make locally or regionally is the result of a very long
game (Link and Scott (2003)). It is also closely related to local or regional absorptive capacity.
Spin-off push on its own is not enough (see for example Florida and Cohen (1999), and Fogarty
and Sinha (1999)).
Finally, it is important to note that tensions continue to arise in the USA between competing
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restrictions on scientific discourse which exclusivity in licensing patenting and spin-offs can
produce. Tension also arises from the impact such activities can have on the direction of
research activity. These tensions, of course, lie at the heart of many of the attitudinal issues
raised by Muizer. Here there are relatively few research findings and the jury is still out. Much
work remains to be done. Mowery et.al.(1999) in their detailed case study could find few direct
indications of changes in research direction, whilst Louis et al (2001) and Blumenthal et al
(1996) report greater secrecy and less disclosure over research findings amongst industry
funded researchers. It does not appear, however, that such researchers are any less productive
scientifically as judged by peer review (see e.g. Zucker and Darby (1996) and the evidence
reviewed in Poyogo-Theotoky et al (2003)). This is consistent with the role played by research
in Pasteur’s quadrant. It could also reflect some selection bias in that the best scientists have
the greatest opportunities to attract industrial support.
4.6 Concluding remarks
This brief set of reflections has been intended to place innovative start-ups and university spin-
off activity in perspective and draw some possible policy implications. 
I have discussed evidence from a range of countries but have placed some emphasis on the
USA. This was deliberate because there is little doubt that the experience of that country has
loomed large in many policy discussions about the competitive challenges and policy options
facing the EU and its member states. This is not to deny that a great deal can be learned from
the sharing of best practice in the EU and the analysis of other country specific innovation
systems. Indeed the discussion of the experience of the USA points to many issues (e.g. the
scale of federal support, and the nature of the university system) which should caution against
the notion of transplanting parts of any one system onto another.
That said the first general point which should be made is that an emphasis on technology
based industries as conventionally defined ignores the critical role played by technology
‘using’ industries. Economy level impacts of developments in a sector depend upon the size of
the industries affected and not just their productivity growth. This is exemplified by the role of
the wholesaling and retailing sectors in the USA.
The second general point is that a key driver of overall productivity growth is productivity
growth in existing firms. The direct effect of new entry is considerably smaller, and university
based spin-offs are a tiny proportion of overall start-ups.
The impact of new entry is greater over the longer term and plays a bigger role in more
technologically turbulent industrial settings. 
These two general points suggest that raising the rate of innovative university spin-offs is
unlikely by itself to lead to major short term shifts in macroeconomic performance. Moreover,
the direct impact through the growth of such firms and the indirect effect they may have on
technology using sectors depends critically upon management competence and organisational
innovation. This points to the development of educational programmes in business schools
which combine technical with managerial competence, and mobility of experienced managers
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entrepreneurial skills is a moot point since they are in essence generic management and
business skills applied in particular industrial and business settings.
The third general point is that the notion of knowledge transfer as a linear process whereby
basic science in pursuit of fundamental understanding has to be dragged through successive
stages to considerations of use is deeply misleading. It ignores the many mechanisms
whereby issues of use and fundamental understanding are jointly considered. It can also lead
to too narrow a focus on ‘commercialization’ through patenting and spin-offs as the final stage
compared to the many other dimensions of interaction through publication, consultancy and
graduate education and recruitment. 
On the more specific issue of the process of university-industry interactions it is helpful to
break away from the linear approach and to summarize the implications of the knowledge
transfer process in the USA in terms of the interactions produced, the incentives to take part
which are provided, and the institutional arrangements or structures in which they occur (see
e.g. OECD (2002). 
In institutional terms it is clear that the diverse decentralized and regional structure of the US
university system has played a central role in enabling university /industry interactions and the
populating of Pasteur’s quadrant. This has, however, occurred over a very long period of time.
It is also the case that the scope for other countries to follow this path depends upon the
structure of their own educational systems. The proposed attention to be paid in the new Dutch
approach to the costs of patent management and the need to develop explicit rules of the
game and clear expectations about commercialization are important in this respect. The impact
of this ‘push’ aspect of policy will however depend upon the absorptive capacity of the firms
(existing and potential) and regions at which it is targeted. This is especially so given the
correct emphasis to be placed upon quality rather than quantity of spin-off activity. It will also
depend on the capacity to develop, in pace with the policy, a pool of suitably skilled and
incentivized professionals to staff the activities. Developing university/industry interactions is a
long game, and is not an area where policy should be expected to deliver short-term payoffs.
The sheer scale of US federal expenditures, and the capacity to use that to drive programs to
include start up and SME involvement, has had a powerful incentive impact upon the
involvement of these groups in technology transfer. The creation through public funds of
research institutions specifically developing university-industry relations has also been a
significant force. This points to the creative use of public expenditure programs to act as a
powerful pull-through agent so that a high public R&D spend and a high share of public
expenditure in GDP offer major opportunities for such activity. (See also Metcalfe et al (2003)
on this point). Mandating a proportion of such expenditures has clearly been an important
component of the small high-technology dynamic in the USA. It would be interesting to
consider this aspect of policy further in the Dutch context given its relatively high share of
public R&D expenditures.
Spin-outs are an important but small and variable part of the overall range of ways in which
the industrialization of scientific advance can occur. The full benefits of universities in
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through the economy, depends upon several dimensions of interaction. These includes an
engagement through the supply of a highly educated graduate labour force, as well as through
the full range of dissemination activity including scientific publication, patents licensing and
consultancy, and modes of cooperation including shared laboratory space, ‘user’ conferences
and foresight exercises (Lester (2003)). Diffusion, moreover, depends upon absorptive capacity
in firms and the ability of technology users to recognise and benefit from technological
developments. Interactions with the stock of existing firms as well as the flow of new start ups
are essential. 
Finally it is clear that some questions remain to be answered about the impact on the direction
and quality of university research of including considerations of use as a criterion in deciding
upon funding patterns. The central point, however, is that it is essential to encourage
interactions between academia and industry which encourage the joint recognition of activity
in Pasteur’s quadrant as satisfying both the search for fundamental understanding and its
interplay with considerations of use. This requires a major commitment to the full range of
university/industry dimensions along which knowledge transfer occurs. A perception that
changing attitudes means a move by universities away from ‘basic’ to applied research
focussed on the generation of patents, licensing income and spin-offs would be to reinforce an
outmoded linear view of innovation. It will make the long road to an effective entrepreneurial
society based on technological advances even longer and the outcome more uncertain.Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 69
Notes Chapter 4
1 As Kreijen and Van der Laag (this volume) point out there is considerable imprecision in the literature about the
definition of, and use of the terms, university spin-off and university spin-out. Where a specific source referred to in
this paper uses one of these terms I have tried to use the same nomenclature, and where a specific definition is
relevant I spell it out (e.g. in relation to data on US spin-outs based on licensing university based technology). In
general the terms spin-off and spin-out are used interchangeably in this paper.
2 For an overview of OECD spin-off activity see OECD (2001). Surveys of general university industry links in the UK are
to be found in UNICO-NUBS (2002), CURDS (2001) and HEFCE (2003). EU (2002a) and UKBI (2000) and Clarysse et.al.
(2002) provide a more normative assessment of good practice in spin-off and incubator management and design
respectively. Siegel et.al.(2003) provide a concise overview of evaluations of the impact of science park location on
business performance in the UK, (which is the most well developed country in this regard) and conclude equally
concisely that ‘The existing evidence suggests that the ‘returns to location on a UK science Park are negligible’ (Siegel
et.al. (2003) p.180). They urge further research. For an assessment if incubators and their impact in an American
context producing equally insignificant results see Di Gregorio and Shane (2003))
3 It is of course easy for holistic policies to become overlapping, inconsistent, and uncoordinated. In the UK a recent
overview of enterprise support policy identified over 150 separate programmes which are to be consolidated into 15 or
16 new programmes. The intention in the Netherlands to consolidate spin-off support programmes in developing a
new policy initiative based on the latest evidence as set out in Kreijen and van der Laag (this volume) is therefore an
excellent idea. 
4 Thus the EU Innovation scoreboard for 2002 shows that in terms of the ratio of total R&D to GDP the Netherlands was
at 1.92% just above the EU average of 1.85% in a group including Denmark Belgium and the UK. It was just below
average in terms of private business R&D. In terms of the ratio of public R&D expenditure to GDP however the
Netherlands at 0.87% was matched only by Sweden and Finland in the EU and it outstripped both the USA and Japan.
The harmonised community innovation survey also shows that business innovation expenditures as a proportion of
manufacturing sales were about average for the EU. The Netherlands was also the leading EU nation in terms of new
capital raised in stock markets as a % of GDP and above average in terms of high tech venture capital investment. The
total of formal and informal venture capital as a % GDP in the Netherlands is second only to that of the USA amongst
high GDP countries and only US and Sweden have more domestic venture capital funds but as with the UK this is
focussed more on later stage and buy outs than start ups (Bosma this volume, EU (2001)).
Innovation output performance matches those input measures which were above average. Thus European Patent Office
high tech patent applications by the Netherlands at 35.8 per million of the population was second only to Finland in the
EU and outstripped both the USA and Japan. The Netherlands also ranked third in the EU behind Finland and Sweden
in terms of US patent office high tech applications. In terms of innovative capacity the EU innovation surveys reveal
that Dutch performance for small firms is above average and somewhat better relatively than performance for its
medium and larger firms. Netherlands scientific and technical journal article production is above average, and above
both UK and USA (Muizer this volume and EU (2001)).
5 The role of clusters has also been emphasised for similar reasons. On the significance of clustering effects in economic
growth and development see e.g. OECD (2001b), Porter and van Opstal (2001), and Porter and Ackerman (2001)), and a
for a critical review of this literature as a guide to policy Martin and Sunley (2002). This general literature is not
reviewed here although some attention is paid to the role of local spillovers in patterns of development in university-
industry relationships. 
6 The same picture of a concentrated period of growth in the second half of the nineties emerges if the period 1972 to
1995 is disaggregated and allowance made for the nature of the trade cycle (OECD 2003)).
7 For example, Carree et al. (2002) present a two-equation model to analyze the interrelationship between economy-wide
business ownership rates and economic development. They apply the model to a data set of 23 OECD countries for the
period 1976-96. Their entrepreneurship proxy is the business ownership rate, defined as the number of non-agricultural
business owners (both unincorporated and incorporated) as a share of the labour force (see Van Stel, 2003, for a
description of the COMPENDIA (Comparative Entrepreneurship Data for International Analysis) dataset on which this
analysis is based). In their paper, an hypothesized ‘equilibrium’ relationship between business ownership rate and
stage of economic development (as proxied by GDP per capita) is estimated. They report a U shaped relationship
which is negative for the larger part of the range of GDP per capita but with evidence of a positive relationship at the
highest levels of GDP per capita. They also argue that countries that out-of-equilibrium level of business ownership
had a negative impact on economic growth, but experienced slow convergence to ‘equilibrium’ ownership rate levels. Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 70
8 Similar results hold for services although measurement difficulties produce more variability across countries in the
patterns observed (OECD ((2003) p.136).
9 In a similar vein Bosma and Nieuwenhuijsen (2000), for example, assessed the impact of churning on total factor
productivity growth on a regional basis for the Netherlands. They found a positive effect of ‘churning’ on total factor
productivity growth for services industries, over a three-year time period, but no short-term impact in manufacturing
industries.
10 It is important to note that there are some variations in the firm size cut-off points used by countries in carrying out the
CIS surveys. Whereas some countries include all firms, others exclude firms with less than 10 or 20 employees. So the
results for some countries will exclude constraints reported by the very smallest firms (see e.g. Cosh Hughes and
Wood (1998)). 
11 The fourth quadrant is left unlabelled by Stokes. It is not empty but contains research which for instance systematizes
knowledge in an area (e.g. research producing ornithological field guides (Stokes (1999)).
12 See for example Hall et al (2001) and Wessner (1999) for analyses of the AT Program and Grossman et.al (2001) for a
wider evaluation of academic research impacts on industrial performance.
13 The precise role of Bayh-Dole in these trends is difficult to isolate because of the problem of establishing a good
counterfactual. Mowery et. al. in a detailed examination of the Universities of California, Columbia, and Stanford argue
that the scale of existing university industry interaction had already led to licensing activity reinforced in biomedical
areas by separate IPR court judgements (Mowery et.al. (1999)). Equally it can be argued that in one of the earliest most
dynamic areas of patenting and licensing, (biotechnology) conditions were propitious for scientist entrepreneurs
exercising intellectual ownership rights to exploit their discoveries because of their combined tacit and codified
knowledge. In the early stages this ability rested with a small community of scholars who chose to stay with their
academic institutions whilst developing the commercial possibilities of the science (Colyvas et. al. (2002), Zucker et.al.
(1998)) Poyago-Theotoky et.al.(2003)). 
14 The AUTM use a conservative definition of a university based start-up which specifies that the start-up must be
dependent upon the license from the institution for its formation (AUTM (2002). It should be noted that there is some
upward bias in the data quoted here because of increases in the number of institutions responding to the AUTM
surveys. The AUTM also report results for constant samples which show the same broad trends reported in the text.
15 There is a substantive literature on which types of firms or individuals succeed in spin-offs which is not addressed
here, see for example Shane and Stuart (2002), Levin and Stephan (1991) Roberts (1991) Zucker et al (1998)Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands 71
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